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two million people are subject to its jurisdiction.  Studying the military justice system 
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criminal justice issues and theoretical perspectives in a different legal system that 
includes jury sentencing.  The present study applies organizational efficiency, uncertainty 
avoidance, and court community perspectives to investigate whether military offenders 
who assert their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial are penalized with harsher 
sentences than offenders who plead guilty.  Using Air Force court-martial data from 2005 
and 2006, the results of the study found no support for a trial penalty effect and also 
found that juries are less likely to impose severe types of punishment compared to judges.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The military justice system is a part of the overall American legal system with 
over two million people, including some civilians, subject to its jurisdiction (Office of 
Under Secretary of Defense, 2007; Secretary of Defense, 2008).1  Despite the far 
jurisdictional reach of this court system, criminal justice researchers have largely ignored 
the military system and the offenders that are processed through it.  Only a handful of 
studies exist in the published literature examining military courts-martial, and these 
studies do not apply theoretical perspectives found in the civilian sentencing literature.  
Furthermore, the civilian court studies are not generalizable to the military because of 
differences in the populations and legal systems.  The military population is 
predominately male, has a smaller proportion of Hispanics, is more educated and 
younger, and has a very small proportion of members with any criminal history 
(Department of Defense, 2005).2  Moreover, the military justice system has the additional 
purpose of maintaining good order and discipline in the military, limits the prosecutor’s 
discretion, permits jury sentencing, and offers broad types of punishments and 
punishment ranges.  Thus, studying the military is not only important for advancing 
knowledge of a neglected population, it also offers the opportunity to explore criminal 
justice issues and theoretical perspectives within a legal system that has some differences 
from its civilian counterparts.   
                                               
1 In 2006, Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to allow prosecution of civilians 
working in military operations (Secretary of Defense, 2008).   
2 According to the 2005 Department of Defense report on Social Representation in the U.S. Military 
Service, females account for 15% of the military, 99% of all recruits have a high school diploma or 
equivalent, 47% of the enlisted force is between the ages of 17 and 24, and although African Americans are 
representative of the civilian population (13%), Hispanics are underrepresented (10%).  In 2004, waivers 
were granted for felony convictions by the respective services as follows:  Air Force 0.011%;  Army 5.7%,  
Navy 0.1%, and  Marines 0.6% (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2006). 
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 An issue that has received considerable attention by researchers and criminal 
justice officials is whether an offender is penalized with a more severe sentence when he 
asserts his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  This phenomenon is frequently referred 
to as a “trial penalty” or “process discount” in criminal justice studies.  Although research 
is somewhat mixed on whether a trial penalty or process discount actually exists, most 
studies have found a trial penalty effect (e.g. Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; Zatz and Hagan, 
1985; Ulmer, 1997; Uhlman and Walker, 1979; Brereton and Casper, 1982; Walsh, 1990; 
King, Soule, Steen, and Weidner, 2005; Johnson, 2003).  Furthermore, research has 
focused almost exclusively on civilian jurisdictions that do not permit juries to sentence 
offenders in non-capital cases.  Only a small number of published studies have examined 
the trial penalty question in jury sentencing jurisdictions and none of them are the 
military (e.g. King and Noble, 2004, 2005; Weninger, 1994; Baab and Ferguson, 1967).  
Thus, the present study addresses this empirical void in the literature by examining 
whether a process discount exists in military sentencing.   
 Although this investigation is exploratory in nature, it also seeks to apply civilian 
court based theoretical perspectives to military sentencing.  Aspects of organizational 
efficiency, uncertainty avoidance, and court community perspectives are particularly 
relevant to the trial penalty issue and have found some empirical support in sentencing 
research.  For example, several studies have asserted that court actors induce guilty pleas 
via plea bargaining to reduce the use of court resources (Dixon, 1995; Engen and Steen, 
2000; e.g. King and Noble, 2004, 2005; King et al., 2005).  As a result, this court process 
rewards offenders who plead guilty with less severe punishments than offenders who go 
to trial.  Moreover, court community studies have suggested that court actors are part of 
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an interrelated workgroup that develops “going rates” based on past cases to reduce 
uncertainty in the outcome and to facilitate plea bargaining (Ulmer, 1997; Eisenstein and 
Jacob, 1977; Eisenstein et al., 1988; Nardulli et al., 1988).  These going rates have 
resulted in less severe punishments for offenders who plead guilty than those who assert 
their right to trial (Eisenstein et al., 1988).  Finally, other studies incorporate aspects of 
the uncertainty avoidance perspective (Albonetti, 1991) by asserting that judges use 
“patterned responses” when faced with more limited information regarding the likelihood 
of future offending (e.g. Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998; Ulmer and Bradley, 
2006).  In guilty pleas, judges are less likely to be exposed to aggravating facts and make 
situational imputations from case and offender characteristics that produce a trial penalty 
effect (Ulmer and Bradley, 2006).  Although these theoretical perspectives have been 
used to explain sentencing disparity, research has not fully addressed their applicability to 
jury sentencing and has never extended these perspectives to the military.   
 Therefore, this study intends to advance the quantitative research on military as 
well as civilian sentencing by exploring the trial penalty question within military courts.  
First, I examine some of the major differences between the military and civilian court 
systems that are most likely to affect sentencing, and then I review the military, trial 
penalty, and jury sentencing literature.  Second, I apply concepts from the theoretical 
perspectives of uncertainty avoidance, organizational efficiency, and court communities 
to the military system and develop specific hypotheses.  Third, using Air Force courts-
martial data, I expand on previous research by examining whether military offenders 
receive a process discount when they select a mode of conviction that reduces uncertainty 
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and minimizes the use of court resources.  Finally, I discuss the findings of this research 
and its implications for policy and future studies.   
Military Justice System 
 Before exploring the trial penalty issue, understanding some of the differences 
between civilian and military courts is essential.  One of the most fundamental 
distinctions between civilian and military legal systems lies in their purposes.  The 
military justice system is not only a justice system designed to protect individual rights 
and promote due process, fairness, and impartiality like civilian justice systems, but it is 
also a disciplinary tool designed to maintain good order and discipline—a necessity for 
the effectiveness of all military units (Manual for Court Martial, 2005; Moorman, 2000).  
For the military to function successfully, commanders must ensure that military members 
in their units will perform their duties and follow orders even in situations involving life 
and death (Moorman, 2000).  Because the military justice system has an additional 
purpose of maintaining good order and discipline, the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) contains military specific offenses such as absence without leave (AWOL), 
desertion, mutiny, failure to obey an order, and dereliction of duty.   For instance, a 
military member could be prosecuted for not showing up for work or failing to perform 
his core job duties.   Moreover, because the commander is responsible for maintaining 
order and discipline, the commander controls aspects of the military justice system that 
ordinarily would fall within the purview of the civilian prosecutor (Perdue, 1999; 
Moorman, 2000).     
 The role of prosecutorial discretion has been the subject of several studies in the 
civilian court systems (e.g. Albonetti, 1986, 1987; Miethe, 1987; Wooldredge and 
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Griffin, 2005).  Unlike civilian courts, the military limits the discretion of prosecutors by 
placing the decisions about which cases to prosecute and plea bargain in the hands of a 
non-lawyer, known as the convening authority.  The convening authority is a commander 
that holds a specific command position designated with the power to convene courts-
martial, enter into plea agreements, and reduce or approve adjudged sentences (Manual 
for Courts-Martial, 2005).  Consequently, the plea bargaining process in the military also 
differs slightly from the process in civilian courts.     
 In the military, plea agreements are formal written agreements made between the 
accused and the convening authority, not the prosecutor (Manual for Courts-Martial, 
2005).  The negotiated sentence limitations contained in the agreements are not revealed 
to the sentencing authority (judge or jury) prior to imposing punishment.  The existence 
of an agreement is disclosed to the judge because she has to question the accused 
regarding his knowledge of the agreement, voluntariness, and any rights he is waiving.  
In contrast, if a jury is the sentencing authority, it has no knowledge of whether an 
agreement exists prior to determining sentence (Manual for Courts-Martial, 2005).   
  Military offenders have the right to have a jury determine their punishments 
regardless if they plead guilty or assert their right to a trial.  Although civilian 
jurisdictions use jury sentencing in death penalty cases, only six states provide jury 
sentencing in non-capital cases (King and Noble, 2004, Texas Ann. Code, 2007).  Similar 
to jury sentencing states, the military system also provides the accused with the right to 
have a jury determine his punishment even in non-capital cases (Manual for Court-
Martial, 2005). 3  Even though this right has been the subject of regular debate in UCMJ 
                                               
3  “Court members” is the term used for “jury” under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Manual for 
Court-Martial, 2005).   
6 
 
reform discussions, jury sentencing remains a part of the military justice system today 
(Jackson, 2004; Department of Defense, 1984).   
 Just as the additional right of jury sentencing is provided in the military, a 
bifurcated trial/sentencing process also exists in the military justice system that is similar 
to civilian capital cases.  In all courts-martial, a presentencing hearing is held in which 
mitigating and aggravating evidence is presented for the sentencing authority to consider 
before determining the appropriate punishment.  Moreover, as in the federal sentencing 
process, the prosecution and defense may enter into stipulations of fact to avoid lengthy 
witness testimony and presentation of physical evidence (Manual for Courts Martial, 
2005; Vowell, 1986).   
 In military sentencing, the sentencing authority retains a great deal of discretion in 
what type of punishment to impose.  Sentencing guidelines, three strikes laws, mandatory 
minimums, probation, and restitution do not exist in the military system.  Additionally, 
several types of punishments are available and may be combined for one sentence 
depending on the type of court-martial and offense (Manual for Courts Martial, 2005).   
Some of the military punishments are analogous to civilian punishments (e.g. 
confinement, fines), but the punitive discharge is a punishment unique to the military. A 
punitive discharge terminates the offender’s status in the military and indicates that he 
was discharged due to bad conduct or under conditions of dishonor depending on the type 
of punitive discharge imposed (Manual for Courts Martial, 2005:RCM 1003(b)(8)). 4   
These types of discharges as opposed to administrative discharges may only be imposed 
in a court-martial and are considered a severe punishment because they result in loss of 
                                               
4 There are three types of punitive discharges—Bad Conduct Discharge (BCD), Dishonorable Discharge 
(DD), and Dismissal.  Enlisted receive BCDs and DDs with BCD being less severe than DD.  Officers may 
only receive a Dismissal if a punitive discharge is adjudged and is the equivalent to a DD for enlisted.   
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veteran benefits, retirement benefits, and block opportunities for certain types of 
employment (Department of Army, 2002; Manual for Courts Martial, 2005).  
Consequently, receiving a punitive discharge for an offense that would otherwise be 
considered a misdemeanor in civilian jurisdictions not only removes the offender from 
military service, but also may result in some of the same collateral consequences as 
civilian felony convictions.   
 Despite the sentencing authority’s broad discretion in determining a sentence, 
some punishment limitations exist depending on the type of court-martial.  Three 
different types of court-martial exist in the military justice system including summary 
court-martial, special court-martial, and general court-martial.  Summary courts-martial 
are not considered convictions outside of the military because the accused does not have 
a right to counsel or a jury trial.5  These courts are utilized less frequently than special 
and general courts-martial and are reserved for minor offenses.  Special courts-martial 
carry a maximum punishment of 12 months confinement and the least severe punitive 
discharge, Bad Conduct Discharge (Manual for Court Martial, 2005).  This type of court-
martial is rarely used to prosecute officers because a punitive discharge for officers is not 
an authorized punishment in a special court-martial.  For general courts-martial, the 
maximum punishment is whatever is permissible under the UCMJ for that specific 
offense (Manual for Court Martial, 2005).  Thus, officers and more serious offenses are 
more likely to be prosecuted in general courts-martial.  The types of court-martial may be 
somewhat analogous to civilian jurisdictions that designate different types of courts based 
on misdemeanor or felony classifications of offenses.  However, the convictions received 
                                               
5 By regulation, the Air Force provides the accused with a defense counsel, but they are still not considered 
convictions (Air Force Instruction 51-201).   
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in military courts-martial are not always comparable in these terms because a punitive 
discharge is authorized in special courts-martial.  Moreover, civilian jurisdictions vary in 
which offenses are classified as felonies or misdemeanors.   
 In sum, although the military and civilian court systems are similar, clearly 
several differences remain that limit the generalizability of findings in civilian trial 
penalty studies to military sentencing.  The military system serves as a justice system as 
well as a tool for the commander to maintain good order and discipline.  Because of this 
dual purpose, a prosecutor’s discretion in deciding to prosecute a case and plea bargain is 
substantially curtailed and placed in the hands of the convening authority, a non-lawyer.  
Moreover, military offenders enjoy additional due process protections that are typically 
only seen in capital cases in civilian courts such as a sentencing phase and jury 
sentencing.  Finally, the military justice system grants the sentencing authority a great 
deal of discretion in determining the appropriate punishment with broad ranges and types 
available.  Because of the unique aspects of this legal system, an investigation into 
military sentencing is warranted.  Thus, the present study provides a valuable 
contribution to the literature by exploring the trial penalty or process discount within the 
military.   
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW  
 Few published empirical studies exist on sentencing in the military justice system, 
thus, this study is also guided by research on the civilian court systems.  First, a review of 
the military sentencing literature is necessary to provide a baseline for what has been 
studied in previous military sentencing research.6  Second, studies on the existence of a 
trial penalty in civilian jurisdictions reveal the mixture of results and various methods 
that have been employed to study this issue.  Finally, research on jury sentencing will 
further guide this investigation and provide insight into the effect of jury sentencing on 
the presence of a process discount or trial penalty.   
Military Justice Research 
 Despite many articles discussing possible reforms to the military justice system 
(e.g. Sylkatis, 2006; Vowell, 1986; Moorman, 2000; Gierke, 2005; Essex & Pickle, 2002) 
few empirical studies have been published.  The following review of the military justice 
literature discusses the three studies found in the published literature (Landis, Dansby, 
and Hoyle, 1997; Perry, 1977; Verdugo, 1998) and one unpublished dissertation 
(Burchett, 1983).  All of these studies have focused on race effects in sentencing rather 
than the existence of a process discount, but the findings seem to consistently suggest that 
black offenders are less likely to plea bargain.  Despite this general finding in the 
literature, most of the studies found no significant difference in sentence lengths between 
white and black offenders.     
                                               
6 The Department of Defense, Army and Navy have conducted some military justice studies over the years.  
However, these technical reports are not discussed in this literature review because they are not a part of the 
published empirical literature, not subject to peer review, and not methodologically rigorous with many 
relying on descriptive statistics to draw conclusions.  Furthermore, none of these studies explored the trial 
penalty question.  In contrast, this literature review includes a discussion of an unpublished dissertation 
(Burchett, 1983) because it contains a finding regarding the effect of mode of conviction and employs a 
multivariate analysis.   
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  Landis, Dansby, and Hoyle (1997) examined the effects of race regarding the 
length of processing time in the system and whether it had an effect on the length of 
confinement adjudged.  Landis et al. used a sample of Army court-martial cases in which 
charges were preferred for aggravated assault, drug crimes, and sex crimes between June 
30, 1986 and January 1, 1992.  By exploring bivariate relationships, the study found that 
black offenders spent significantly more time in the system than whites and that the total 
time spent in the system was positively related to the length of sentence imposed.  
Additionally, the authors found that black offenders were less likely to plea bargain than 
white offenders, but the study did not specifically examine the effects of race or mode of 
conviction on sentence length.   
 Similar to Landis et al. (1997), Verdugo (1998) used Army court-martial data 
from July 1986 to December 1992, but only examined aggravated assaults.  Relying 
solely on descriptive statistics, the study found that whites were more likely to plead 
guilty (87%) than blacks (72%), and whites were more likely to enter into plea 
agreements (69% compared to 51%).  Regarding choice of forum, white offenders were 
also more likely to choose a judge over a jury (74%) than black offenders (64%).  Despite 
these differences, however, Verdugo found no significant difference in mean confinement 
length for blacks and whites.     
 As opposed to Landis et al. (1997) and Verdugo (1998), Burchett (1983), an 
unpublished dissertation, used a multiple regression model that included prior 
convictions, type of court, and mode of conviction as control variables.  This study 
examined the effects of race in Army absence without leave (AWOL) cases tried between 
1971 and 1974.  Burchett found that race did not have a significant effect on the sentence 
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imposed and major determinants of sentence were the type of court (special court-martial 
and general court-martial), a prior conviction for desertion, mode of conviction, and the 
number of charges.  Specifically, those who chose a jury trial received longer 
confinement sentences, holding everything else constant, than those with pretrial 
agreements.  Therefore, although Burchett did not address whether a trial penalty existed 
for all types of offenses, his study provides some indication that a trial penalty may exist 
at least for the offense of AWOL.        
 An older study conducted by Perry (1977) examined the effects of race on 
sentences in the Navy and Marine Corp based on a census of all enlisted grade prisoners 
in confinement during the last quarter of 1972.  The study found no statistically 
significant differences in the mean sentence length between black prisoners and white 
prisoners across all four offense classes examined--major military and civilian equivalent 
offenses, confrontation or status offenses, unauthorized absence, and other military 
offenses equivalent to civilian offenses.  Even though the study did not address mode of 
conviction, it provided an analysis of race across a broader range of offense-types than 
Landis et al. (1987), Verdugo (1998) and Burchett (1983).   
 Overall, the military justice studies have found that black offenders are less likely 
to plead guilty with a pretrial agreement than white offenders, but most studies also found 
that race has no effect on the mean sentence length.  Although the literature focuses on 
race, this may provide some indication that a process discount does not exist in military 
sentencing.  Nonetheless, these studies are methodologically weak and none of the data 
include Air Force courts-martial.  Burchett (1983), the only study to utilize a multivariate 
analysis, found the existence of a trial penalty in his study of AWOL offenses despite the 
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absence of a race effect.  Also worth noting is the time period of the court-martial data 
used in these studies.  Two of the studies (Burchett, 1983 and Perry, 1977) use data from 
the early 1970s—the later years of the conflict in Vietnam and prior to the conversion to 
an all-volunteer force.  Although Landis et al. (1997) and Verdugo (1998) use more 
recent data (1986 to 1992), significant downsizing of the military forces occurred after 
1991 when Congress called for a 25 percent reduction in force by the end of fiscal year 
1995 (United States General Accounting Office, 1993).  A reduction in force may have 
resulted in more restrictive enlistment policies.  Therefore, although these studies provide 
some insight into the military justice system, they have substantial limitations. 
Trial Penalty Sentencing Research 
 Due to the sparseness of the military justice literature, a review of the trial penalty 
literature using civilian criminal justice data is necessary for guiding the current research.  
The majority of studies have found that defendants receive more severe sentences when 
they are convicted by jury trial in comparison to those convicted by guilty plea (e.g. 
Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; Johnson, 2003; Uhlman and Walker, 1979; Brereton and 
Casper, 1982; Walsh, 1990; King, Soule, Steen, and Weidner, 2005).   Additionally, other 
studies using mode of conviction as a control variable have found significant positive 
effects for trials as opposed to guilty pleas when examining sentence severity (e.g. 
Peterson and Hagan, 1984; Dixon, 1995; Engen and Gainey, 2000; Spohn and Holleran, 
2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000).  Finally, significantly fewer studies have found 
that mode of conviction has no significant effect on the sentencing outcome, with most of 
these studies positing that the probability of acquittal negates the more severe 
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punishments imposed after a trial (Rhodes, 1979; Smith, 1986; Eisenstein and Jacob, 
1977; LaFree, 1985).   
 The earlier trial penalty research was conducted by Uhlman and Walker (1979, 
1980) which studied major felony cases in a metropolitan city from 1968 to 1974.  
Uhlman and Walker found that defendants who pleaded guilty were substantially less 
likely to receive incarceration than defendants convicted at a jury trial.  Defendants that 
were convicted with a bench trial, however, were more likely to be acquitted and if 
convicted, they received sentences marginally more severe than defendants that pleaded 
guilty.  A few years later, Brereton and Casper (1982) conducted a study limited to 
robbery and burglary cases in three large California jurisdictions from 1974 to 1978.   
Using chi-square analysis, the study found that trial cases resulted in prison sentences 
more often than guilty plea cases.  As in Uhlman and Walker (1979), this study lacked 
variables that addressed preconviction information, but unlike Uhlman and Walker 
(1979) did not address the probability of acquittal.   
 Walsh (1990) analyzed a random sample of felony cases processed in one Ohio 
county during 1978 to 1983.  Walsh’s study did not just examine the final disposition 
charges, but also studied a difference between the arraigned charges and the final charges 
(i.e. plea bargained charge reductions).  Walsh found that the mode of conviction was 
insignificant in a two-tailed test when examining the final charge, however, when 
considering the arraigned charges, he found going to trial had a significant positive effect 
on sentence severity.  
 The most recent trial penalty research was conducted by King, Soule, Steen and 
Weidner (2005) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006).  King et al., studied five states with 
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sentencing guidelines to determine whether defendants who waive their right to a jury 
trial receive less severe sentences.  To examine sentence severity, King et al. explored 
whether the probability of receiving incarceration was lower for bench trials and guilty 
pleas in comparison to jury trials and whether significant differences existed in sentence 
length when incarcerated.  Although the study found a significant plea discount in all five 
states, the results were mixed regarding the effect of bench trials.   
 Ulmer and Bradley (2006) not only attempted to answer the primary research 
question of whether a trial penalty exists, but also tried to determine how trial penalties 
might vary.  The article explored differences in sentencing between those that pled guilty 
and those convicted by jury trial using Pennsylvania sentencing data from 1997 to 2000.  
The study found that odds of incarceration following a bench trial or jury trial were 2.2 
and 2.7 times the odds respectively of a guilty plea.  Additionally, jury trials resulted in 
significantly longer sentences than guilty pleas, controlling for court caseloads; however, 
the study did not control for the likelihood of conviction, which studies have shown 
mitigates trial penalties (e.g. Smith, 1986; Rhodes, 1979; LaFree, 1985).    
 Despite these numerous studies finding support for the existence of a trial penalty, 
other studies have either found no effect or a minimal effect.  Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) 
examined a sample comprised of 1,500 defendants convicted of felonies in three cities—
Chicago, Detroit, and Baltimore—in 1972.  The study found that the mode of 
conviction’s effect on sentence substantially diminished in both the decision to 
incarcerate and sentence length.  Similarly, Rhodes (1979) and Smith (1986) found little 
support for a significant trial penalty when taking into account the likelihood of acquittal.  
Rhodes studied felony cases prosecuted in 1974 from the District of Columbia and found 
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no significant differences, with the exception of robbery, between the decision to 
incarcerate and sentence for defendants convicted of assault, larceny, and burglary.  
Furthermore, Rhodes referred to the discount for pleading guilty as “a myth,” and further 
found that if the guilty plea defendants had gone to trial, the probability of being 
convicted would have been between .66 and .82 depending on the type of offense.   
 Smith (1986) examined a sample of felony robbery and burglary cases from five 
sites—New Orleans, Norfolk, Seattle, Tucson, and Delaware County, Pennsylvania.  The 
study found that defendants were less likely to receive a sentence of incarceration for a 
year or more when the offenses were less serious and have less evidence against them.  
Conversely, offenders with prior records that were convicted of serious offenses did not 
reduce their probability of receiving incarceration by pleading guilty.   
 LaFree (1985) analyzed a sample of 3,269 male defendants prosecuted for 
robbery or burglary in six jurisdictions from 1976 to 1977.  When controlling for case 
variables such as eyewitness testimony, confession, and physical evidence, LaFree found 
that mode of conviction had no effect when including acquittals in the analysis, which 
further supports the contention that acquittals are an important factor in trial penalty 
research.   
 A review of the trial penalty research illustrates how varied the methods and 
findings of the research in this area have been, but in general, research has shown 
empirical support for the existence of a trial penalty.  Nevertheless, most of the studies in 
the literature use data with case dispositions in the 1970s and the most recent studies 
analyze data in states with sentencing guidelines.  Finally, these studies do not address 
the added element of jury sentencing, which is present in the military justice system.  
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Jury Sentencing Research 
 Jury sentencing in felony non-capital cases is permitted in six states, but only a 
handful of published empirical studies have examined the impact of jury sentencing on 
sentence outcomes (King and Noble, 2004; King and Noble, 2005; Baab and Furgeson, 
1967; Smith and Stevens, 1984; Weninger, 1994).7  Overall, the studies have found that a 
defendant incurs a more severe sentence when a jury rather than a judge determines his 
sentence.   Nevertheless, these studies were conducted in different jurisdictions that vary 
in when a defendant has a right to have a jury decide his sentence, and some studies are 
more methodologically rigorous than others.   
 Smith and Stevens (1984) compared robbery sentences in published appellate 
opinions from jurisdictions with jury sentencing and jurisdictions with judge alone 
sentencing from 1957-1982.  The study found that judges imposed more severe sentences 
than juries.  However, the results of the study should be taken with caution because the 
sample used in the study suffered from selection bias.  The sampling frame did not 
include all of the robbery cases—only those that chose to appeal and for which the 
appellate decision was published.  Cases that are appealed are more likely to be 
convictions through a trial, and appeals that are published opinions generally have new or 
important legal questions requiring written discussion (Neubauer, 1985).  Additionally, 
the sample size was small (N=160) and did not control for mode of conviction, prior 
criminal history, age, or race.   
                                               
7 The following states allow some form of jury sentencing in felony non-capital cases:  Virginia, Kentucky, 
Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma.  Although jury sentencing is prevalent in capital cases 
throughout the United States, capital juries only determine whether a defendant receives death or life in 
prison.  At least one study has found that judges are more likely to impose death than juries (Kalven and 
Zeisel, 1966); however, because of the limited sentencing choices and sentencing process, judge-jury 
differences in capital cases are not comparable to non-capital felony cases (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; 
Haney, Sontag, Costanzo, 1994; Sweeney and Haney, 1992).       
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 King and Noble’s (2004) study was more comprehensive and methodologically 
sound than Smith and Stevens (1984) because it included all non-capital felony cases in 
three states during the studied time frames and incorporated qualitative data along with 
the quantitative analyses.8  The quantitative analyses revealed that in Kentucky, the 
average length of incarceration within offense types was longer for those defendants that 
had a jury trial (sentenced by jury) than those who plead guilty and a judge sentenced.  In 
Virginia, a sentencing guidelines state, the average sentences after a jury trial were more 
severe than average sentences after bench trial or guilty plea.  This was especially true for 
drug offenses, but the effect was insignificant for some offenses such as rape.  The 
findings for Arkansas were similar to Virginia—for drug cases, the average sentence 
length was longer for jury trials than for bench trial sentences even when controlling for 
case seriousness.  The differences were insignificant for other offenses such as robbery, 
battery, and rape.   
 King and Noble (2005) was a more extensive quantitative analysis of the 
sentencing data from Arkansas and Virginia from 1995 to 2001.  Sentence severity was 
measured with a severity scale rather than comparing average length of incarceration.  
King and Noble found consistent results with their preliminary analyses contained in 
King and Noble (2004).  The juries in Arkansas and Virginia selected more severe 
sentences than sentences selected by judges after bench trial and guilty plea, at least for 
the serious felony offenses the study examined.   
 Although King and Noble’s studies (2004, 2005) provide much needed insight 
into the existence of a trial penalty in states with jury sentencing, both of the studies fail 
to examine states in which a jury may impose a sentence after the defendant enters a 
                                               
8 Kentucky was from 2000 to 2001; Virginia and Arkansas were from 1995 to 2001.  
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guilty plea.  Weninger (1994) and Baab and Furguson (1967) studied jury sentencing in 
Texas—a state that permits jury sentencing even after pleading guilty.  These studies had 
mixed results.     
 Weninger (1994) conducted a case study of El Paso county and included 
qualitative survey data as well as quantitative sentencing data.  The dataset was 
composed of a random sample of 1,395 noncapital felony prosecutions in district courts 
between 1974-1977.  The study examined whether juries when compared to judges were 
more likely to incarcerate rather than give probation and whether the length of 
incarceration was longer.  Overall, Weninger found juries imposed more severe sentences 
than judges.  Nevertheless, the study had limitations such as El Paso County’s use of a 
voluntary guidelines sentencing system when the defendant chose to plead guilty and be 
sentenced by a judge.  Furthermore, even if a defendant chose a jury trial, he was 
permitted to choose whether a judge or a jury imposed sentence.   Thus, the findings in 
Weninger are not generalizable to all jurisdictions with jury sentencing because the 
sentencing process had some procedural differences.   
 Baab and Furgeson (1967) conducted a broader study of Texas sentencing than 
Weninger (1994) when they collected a sample of cases sentenced in 1966 from 27 courts 
located across a cross-section of 19 counties.  The study measured sentence severity 
using a scale, and found that mode of conviction (guilty plea or trial) and sentencing 
authority (jury or judge) had no effect on sentence severity.  Thus, even when controlling 
for the sentencing authority, the study found no trial penalty was imposed for defendants 
that chose to assert their right to a trial, the opposite finding of Weninger (1994).  
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 In summary, a review of the literature reveals empirical support for a trial penalty 
or process discount in sentencing, however, whether this trial penalty effect is in the 
military or jury sentencing jurisdictions is unknown.  Moreover, some research suggests 
that the presence of a trial penalty effect found in prior studies is largely due to the failure 
to include acquittals in the analyses (Smith, 1986; LaFree, 1985; Rhodes, 1979; cf. Zatz 
and Hagan 1985).  Therefore, the current study expands on the literature by examining 
military sentencing outcomes and exploring whether a trial penalty exists in the military, 
which is also a jury sentencing jurisdiction.  
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 CHAPTER 3:  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 Given the lack of research on the military justice court system, it is not surprising 
that researchers have never attempted to apply theoretical perspectives found in the 
sentencing literature to the military.  Although this study is exploratory in nature, 
utilizing existing theoretical concepts in the present investigation can provide some 
valuable insight into the scope of these theoretical perspectives.  Several theoretical 
frameworks have been used to explain sentencing disparity such as racial threat, conflict 
theory, and focal concerns (e.g. Hagan, 1974; Peterson and Hagan, 1984; Steffensmeier, 
Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998); however, uncertainty avoidance, organizational efficiency, 
and court community perspectives are the most relevant to the trial penalty or process 
discount question.9  Organizational efficiency has been frequently offered as an 
explanation for a trial penalty or process discount effect (e.g. Dixon, 1995; Engen and 
Steen, 2000; King et al., 2005) while other studies indicate that uncertainty avoidance 
influences prosecutorial and judicial decisions (Albonetti, 1986, 1987, 1991). 
Furthermore, court community studies have found a trial penalty effect because courts 
utilize going rates in disposing of cases (Eisenstein et al., 1988; Nardulli et al, 1988; 
Ulmer, 1997).  Therefore, the current study uses these perspectives to explore whether the 
trial penalty or process discount found in the majority of civilian studies exists in the 
military as well.   
                                               
9 Racial threat and conflict theory focus on status characteristics as a source of sentencing disparity by 
hypothesizing racial minorities and lower class offenders are more harshly punished.  Focal concerns 
asserts that judges make decisions concerning the offender’s likelihood for future criminal behavior in 
terms of three general categories of focal concerns:  (1) offender blameworthiness and harm caused to the 
victim, (2) protection of the community, and (3) practical implications such as organizational efficiency.  
Focal concerns has applicability to the trial penalty but primarily through its incorporation of organizational 
efficiency and uncertainty avoidance.   
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 In the court community literature, Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) applied an 
organizational paradigm to courts and posited that judges, defense attorneys, and 
prosecutors are part of an interdependent workgroup.  Although the workgroup may have 
several goals, all of the workgroup members have the common goals of disposing of case 
load and reducing uncertainty in outcomes. “The desire to reduce uncertainty leads to the 
development of several norms designed to make behavior predictable” (Eisenstein and 
Jacob, 1977:28).  The most significant norm is the informal “going rate” that facilitates 
the disposition of routine cases (Ulmer, 1997; Eisenstein et al., 1988; Nardulli et al., 
1988).  Going rates reflect past outcomes for particular crimes and defendants that have 
become incorporated into the courtroom community norms (Sudnow, 1965; Eisenstein et 
al., 1988; Nardulli et al., 1988; Ulmer, 1997).  This informal norm reduces uncertainty in 
outcomes by facilitating guilty plea negotiations and influencing judicial sentencing 
decisions (Nardulli et al., 1988; Ulmer and Kramer, 1998).  To reduce uncertainty, the 
workgroup induces guilty pleas by setting going rates less than sentences imposed after 
trials, thus, producing a process discount effect (e.g. Eisenstein et al., 1988).  
  Similar to the courtroom workgroup perspective, Albonetti’s (1986, 1987) 
uncertainty avoidance theory also suggests that court actors seek to eliminate or reduce 
uncertainty of a preferred outcome.  Prosecutors desire a conviction (Albonetti, 1986), 
defense attorneys prefer an acquittal or the least severe sentence possible for their clients 
(Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977), and judges seek to reduce the likelihood of offender 
recidivism (Albonetti, 1991).  Uncertainty is derived from limited information regarding 
the likelihood of the preferred outcome.  Court actors attempt to reduce uncertainty in 
achieving their desired outcomes by routinizing their decision making based on their 
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beliefs about cause and effect relationships from past outcomes (Albonetti, 1986, 1987, 
1991).  In other words, faced with limited information, court actors develop “patterned 
responses” to dispose of cases and determine sentences based on prior outcomes in cases 
with similar case and offender characteristics.  For instance, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys attempt to avoid trials, a source of uncertainty, by relying on past outcomes for 
similar cases in the plea bargaining process.  Judges also have patterned responses 
developed from similar cases to minimize their uncertainty regarding the likelihood of 
recidivism in deciding sentences (Albonetti, 1991).  Because aggravating or “bad” facts 
are more likely to be presented in a trial, judges impose more severe sentences in trials 
than in guilty pleas where they rely more on patterned responses (Ulmer and Bradley, 
2006).   
 Also consistent with the courtroom workgroup notion, the organizational 
efficiency perspective asserts that courtroom actors are part of an interrelated workgroup 
that emphasizes the shared goal of efficient case disposal.  To minimize the use of time 
and costly court resources, the workgroup rewards those who plead guilty and penalizes 
those who go to trial (Dixon, 1995; Engen and Steen, 2000).  Court actors induce 
offenders to plead guilty through a plea bargaining process that administers less severe 
punishments for those who choose a mode of conviction that meets the goal of efficient 
case disposition (Dixon, 1995).  Although other goals may exist, efficient case disposal 
dominates all other goals (Engen and Steen, 2000).  Thus, plea bargaining and going rates 
are instrumental in not only reducing uncertainty, but also in efficiently disposing of 
cases.   
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 Merging these theoretical perspectives, arguably the court community has two 
primary goals—reducing uncertainty in preferred outcomes and efficient case disposal to 
minimize the use of time and court resources.  The offender’s choice for mode of 
conviction (guilty plea vs. trial) affects the degree to which uncertainty and court 
resources are minimized.  Plea bargaining and going rates are tools the court actors use to 
reward offenders with more lenient sentences when they select a mode of conviction that 
is more likely to achieve the court community’s goals.  For instance, guilty pleas as 
opposed to trials provide certainty in conviction and sentence and use fewer court 
resources.  Thus, according to this theoretical framework, guilty pleas should result in 
less severe sentences when compared to trials, a prediction that has found some empirical 
support in the literature (see Chapter 2).   
Applicability to Military Sentencing 
 These theoretical perspectives have never been applied to military sentencing.  
Although differences exist between the civilian and military court systems, uncertainty 
avoidance, organizational efficiency, and court community are likely to have some 
applicability to the present study.  The differences between civilian and military court 
processes that are most relevant to the trial penalty question are (1) limitations on the 
prosecutor’s discretion, (2) the sentencing process, (3) the dual purpose of the military 
justice system, and (4) jury sentencing.   
 First, in civilian courts, the prosecutor possesses discretion in case disposition; 
however, in the military justice system this discretion is vested with the convening 
authority, a military commander.  Nevertheless, the theoretical framework for case 
processing in this study does not hinge on who has the discretion for case disposition; it 
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simply requires that whoever possesses the discretion desires to reduce uncertainty in 
conviction and efficiently dispose of cases.   Similar to the civilian prosecutor, the 
convening authority also has these goals.  By referring a case to court-martial, the 
convening authority has determined that sufficient evidence exists of the offender’s guilt.  
Low conviction rates cast doubt on the convening authority’s ability to properly assess 
cases worthy of prosecution and ultimately the overall fairness of the military justice 
system.  In addition to a preference for convictions, the convening authority desires 
efficient case disposition from a resource perspective.  The convening authority is 
responsible for many costs associated with a trial, including some of the expenses for the 
defense such as expert consultants (Air Force Instruction, 51-201:6.5.3).  These expenses 
can be several thousands of dollars that are paid from the convening authority’s limited 
budget, not to mention the personnel resources needed to conduct a trial (Manual for 
Courts Martial, 2005:RCM 703).    
 Also similar to the civilian prosecutor, the convening authority uses plea 
bargaining and going rates to achieve these goals.  The convening authority enters into 
pretrial agreements that require the offender to waive his right to a trial in exchange for 
some limitation on sentence (e.g. sentence cap, withdrawal of charges, lesser type of 
court).  The negotiated sentence limitations are influenced by going rates determined by 
prior case dispositions and specific case and defendant characteristics (Kelves, 1980).   
 A second difference in the court systems is in the sentencing procedure itself.  
Negotiated sentence limitations are not revealed to the sentencing authority before 
determining sentence.  However, this is not completely incompatible with civilian court 
systems especially where prosecutors are not permitted to recommend sentences (e.g. 
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Flemming, Nardulli, Eisenstein 1992; Eisenstein et al., 1988).  As in those civilian 
jurisdictions, military judges are likely to use going rates established by the court 
community to determine sentences.   
 The third difference between the systems is the military justice system has the 
additional purpose of preserving good order and discipline.  Although this purpose exists, 
it is unlikely to alter the primary goals of the military justice court community.  Reducing 
uncertainty in conviction and efficiently disposing of cases assists the commander in 
maintaining good order and discipline.  After a case has been referred for court-martial, 
the convening authority has determined sufficient evidence exists that the accused 
committed a crime likely to be detrimental to good order and discipline in the military.  
Obtaining a conviction and disposing of cases as quickly as possible deters other military 
members from engaging in similar behavior and prevents the offenders from further 
affecting good order and discipline within their units.  To illustrate this nexus, an Air 
Force regulation regarding court-martial case management states, “The impartial and 
timely administration of military justice helps sustain good order and discipline”  (Air 
Force Instruction, 51-201:12.9.3).  Thus, the court actors and convening authority will 
continue to have the two primary goals of reducing uncertainty and efficient case disposal 
despite the dual purpose of the military justice system.     
 Finally, the fourth difference between military and civilian courts relevant to this 
study is the availability of jury sentencing.  The effect of juries on sentencing is the most 
likely of all the differences to have an effect on the predicted outcomes.  First, prior trial 
penalty research has been primarily conducted in civilian jurisdictions where judges 
impose sentences after a non-capital jury trial (King and Noble, 2004).  Second, 
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uncertainty avoidance, organizational efficiency, and court community perspectives have 
not explicitly addressed the possible effects of jury sentencing on case processing.  Juries 
are not part of the courtroom workgroup and are unfamiliar with the shared expectations 
of the court actors regarding the appropriate penalty for a particular type of case and 
defendant.  In fact, advocates of jury sentencing assert that jury sentences “mirror 
community norms concerning retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation” 
rather than the norms of legal professionals (King and Noble, 2004:888).   
 Nevertheless, prior qualitative research indicates that the court community’s 
going rates are influenced by the sentences that juries impose and that going rates for 
guilty pleas are less than the sentences expected to be imposed by a jury (King and 
Noble, 2004).  If this is the case, then uncertainty avoidance and organizational efficiency 
perspectives suggest that the court community will establish going rates less than jury 
sentences to encourage offenders to select modes of conviction that maximize efficiency 
and predictability in outcome.  Consequently, a process discount should continue to be 
present even in jury sentencing jurisdictions as well as the military justice system.    
 Therefore, even though the military legal system differs somewhat from civilian 
jurisdictions, theoretical perspectives in the sentencing literature may still apply.  By 
extending these concepts to military sentencing, this research hopes to provide more 
insight into these theoretical perspectives. Thus, the present study is guided by 
uncertainty avoidance, organizational efficiency, and court community perspectives in 
developing specific hypotheses that explore whether a process discount exists in military 




 As in other trial penalty and jury sentencing studies, the current research 
examines mode of conviction categories to determine whether offenders who plead guilty 
are rewarded with process discounts in their sentences.  In the military, mode of 
conviction determines the sentencing authority; thus, this study examines four mode of 
conviction categories:  (1) judge guilty plea, (2) jury guilty plea, (3) judge trial, and (4) 
jury trial.10  Drawing upon the theoretical perspectives of uncertainty avoidance, 
organizational efficiency, and court communities, the following hypotheses are presented 
regarding these specific modes of conviction.   
 Jury trials are least likely to meet the goals of the courtroom workgroup because 
they are the most costly and uncertain of all modes of conviction.  Jury trials require 
considerable time and expense associated with the presentation of evidence, witness 
expenses, personnel resources, and preparation.  Not only are jury trials the most 
inefficient mode of conviction for case disposal, they are also a source of uncertainty in 
conviction and sentence.  Juries are susceptible to group dynamics (Kalven and Zeisel, 
1966; Sandys, 1995), more likely to be driven by emotion (King and Noble, 2004) and 
less likely to follow the law when considering mitigating and aggravating evidence (e.g. 
Eisenberg and Wells, 1993; Bentele and Bowers, 2001).  In contrast, judge trials have 
been referred to as “slow pleas,” because they are more efficient than jury trials and more 
predictable in outcome (Nardulli et al, 1988).  Judge trials have more predictable 
sentences because judges are influenced by the court community norms.   Consequently, 
uncertainty avoidance and organizational efficiency suggest that these going rates should 
                                               
10 Although in jury guilty pleas the offender’s guilty plea is accepted by the judge prior to sentencing by the 
jury, the offender must select whether he wants to be sentenced by the judge or jury (i.e. select forum) prior 
to his plea.   
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be more lenient than jury trial sentences to induce guilty pleas.  Similarly, jury guilty 
pleas should have more severe sentences than judge guilty pleas because they are more 
uncertain and less efficient.     
H1:  Jury trial sentences will be more severe than judge trial sentences. 
H2:  Jury guilty plea sentences will be more severe than judge guilty plea sentences.   
 Even though juries are not part of the courtroom workgroup, they continue to 
have a desire for an efficient use of organizational resources.  In the military setting, 
juries are comprised of other military members that are temporarily removed from their 
active duty missions to serve on a court-martial.  From an organizational standpoint, 
military jury members recognize that they are an organizational asset that is being 
diverted.  Because many of them are currently commanders or have been commanders in 
the past, they share the concern of the military court community for efficiency in case 
disposal to minimize the use of time and organizational resources.  Additionally, the jury 
is instructed by the judge in sentencing that a guilty plea may be considered a matter in 
mitigation because the government has been saved the time, effort and expense 
associated with a trial (Department of Army, 2002:8-3-35). Therefore, juries will impose 
more lenient sentences for offenders who plead guilty as opposed to going to trial.   
H3:  Jury guilty plea sentences will be less severe than jury trial sentences.   
 Judge guilty pleas are most likely to satisfy the courtroom workgroup goals of 
reducing uncertainty and efficient case disposition.  A guilty plea substantially reduces, if 
not entirely eliminates, uncertainty in conviction, and judges provide more predictability 
in sentence with their use of going rates in routine cases.  In an effort to reduce 
uncertainty in the likelihood of future offending, judges will apply the court community 
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going rate for a guilty plea that is established in relationship to sentences imposed by 
juries.  Moreover, a judge guilty plea uses the smallest amount of organizational 
resources to dispose of a case.  Thus, the going rate that a judge imposes for a guilty plea 
as opposed to a trial is likely to reflect a discount.    
H4:  Judge guilty pleas will result in less severe sentences than judge trials.   
 Finally, judge trials and jury guilty pleas each satisfy aspects of certainty and 
efficiency but in different ways.  Judge trials possess some uncertainty in conviction, but, 
once an offender is convicted, judge trials are more predictable in sentence when 
compared to jury guilty pleas.  Judge trials are more efficient than jury trials, however, 
they are no more or less efficient than jury guilty pleas.  Although the sentencing portion 
of a judge trial requires less time and resources than a jury guilty plea, judge trials require 
the presentation of evidence in a guilt phase.  Furthermore, the going rates utilized by 
judges are established based on the sentences imposed in similar cases (jury and judge 
cases).  Hence, sentences imposed by judges after a trial are not likely to be less than 
what would have been imposed by a jury after a guilty plea because of this tradeoff 
between predictability and efficiency. 
H5:  Judge trials and jury guilty pleas will result in equally severe sentences. 
 If these specific hypotheses are supported, then this study will lend some support 
for a process discount in military sentencing that is predicted by a theoretical framework 
derived from uncertainty avoidance, organizational efficiency, and court community 
perspectives.  For ease of comparison, these predictions and rationale are also 
summarized in Table 1.  Finally, regardless of whether these hypotheses are supported, 
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this study will provide a significant contribution to the sparse military justice literature 
and expand the existing trial penalty and jury sentencing literature.   
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       Table 1.  Modes of Conviction and Expected Effects on Sentencing Outcomes  
 Judge Guilty Plea Jury Guilty Plea Judge Trial Jury Trial 
     
Certainty in 
Outcome 
Going rates, more 
predictable—
conviction certain  
No going rates, less 
predictable—
conviction certain 
Going rates, more 
predictable—
conviction uncertain  
No going rates, less 
predictable—
conviction uncertain 




Avoid time and 
expense for jury and 
trial   
Avoid time and 
expense for trial, 
cost remains for 
jury   
Avoid time and 
expense for jury, 
cost remains for  
trial 
No savings for 
organizational 
resources 
     
Expected Effect on 
Sentence 
Negative effect on 
severity 
Negative effect on 
severity—smaller 
than judge guilty 
plea 
Negative effect on 
severity—smaller 
than judge guilty 
plea 
Positive effect on 
severity compared 
to all other modes 




CHAPTER 4:  DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
 This study uses secondary, archival data obtained from the Automated Military 
Justice Analysis and Management System (AMJAMS) database maintained by the United 
States Air Force.  The subjects in this research are Air Force members that went to trial or 
pled guilty on court-martial charges in the calendar years 2005 and 2006.  The sample 
consists of 1,505 convicted members and 140 members acquitted of all charges for a total 
sample size of 1,645.  Two subjects are dropped from the analysis.  First, one subject was 
not sentenced because she died prior to sentencing; second, one case was a death penalty 
case.11  After dropping these cases, the final sample size for analysis is 1,643.  The data 
do not contain personal identifiers such as names and social security numbers; however, 
each record has a case identification number assigned by the database program that 
facilitates records checks.  Approximately 24 percent of the data provided by the 
AMJAMS database were missing data related to mode of conviction.  Because mode of 
conviction is the independent variable of interest for this study, almost all of the missing 
data were obtained from the trial transcripts stored at the Military Justice Division on 
Bolling Air Force Base.  Additionally, criminal history data are not maintained in the 
database, thus, this information was also collected directly from the trial transcripts.  To 
ensure the reliability of the data for the present study, random records checks were 
conducted throughout collection of the criminal history data.12 
                                               
11Because death penalty cases proceed through a more complex process, this case is non-comparable to the 
other courts-martial contained in the sample.  
12 In January 2008, the Air Force conducted a study examining the error rates in particular data fields.  
Although the specific results of that study may not be disclosed in this thesis, the data utilized for the 
present study includes data drawn from fields with error rates below 0.05.    
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Dependent Variables  
 The sentence offenders receive is the outcome of interest for this research.  
Civilian trial penalty studies typically measure sentencing outcomes as the decision to 
incarcerate and the length of incarceration or the studies develop a severity scale 
combining these two factors (e.g. Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; Zatz and Hagan, 1985; 
Ulmer, 1997; Uhlman and Walker, 1979; Brereton and Casper, 1982; Walsh, 1990; King, 
Soule, Steen, and Weidner, 2005; Rhodes, 1979; Smith, 1986; Eisenstein and Jacob, 
1977; LaFree, 1985).  Although the incarceration decision and length of confinement are 
possible outcomes in military sentencing, several other types of punishment exist.  
 The possible punishments in the military are no punishment, reprimand, fine, 
forfeiture of pay, reduction in rank, restriction to base limits, hard labor without 
confinement, confinement, and a punitive discharge.  These punishments can be 
collapsed into six categories and may be combined in 32 different ways to form one 
sentence (see Appendix A).  Some of these punishments may be dependent upon others.  
For instance, forfeiture of pay is automatic with a confinement sentence greater than six 
months (Manual for Court Martial, 2005).  Additionally, some punishment types depend 
on the rank of the individual (i.e. hard labor, reduction in rank, forfeiture of pay).  Given 
the large number of conditions and complexity surrounding the less severe punishment 
types—reprimand, fine, forfeiture of pay, reduction in rank, restriction to base, hard labor 
without confinement—military justice researchers as well as judge advocates have 
concentrated on the two most severe types of punishment when evaluating sentence 
severity (e.g. Burchett, 1983).   
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 Other than death, confinement and punitive discharge are the most severe 
punishment types under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and are 
independent punishments (Manual for Court Martial, 2005).   Prior military justice 
studies have either focused exclusively on confinement length (Perry, 1977; Landis et al., 
1997) or have examined the imposition of a punitive discharge and confinement 
separately (Burchett, 1983).  The problem with measuring military sentencing outcomes 
in this manner is that it only measures one type of punishment within the entire sentence.  
Sentences that contain either of these severe types of punishments are considered more 
severe than sentences without them.  For example, some sentences may contain a 
punitive discharge without confinement.  An analysis of the decision to impose 
confinement without consideration for the punitive discharge would result in the punitive 
discharge only sentence being considered less severe than a sentence that includes 
confinement.  Consequently, this type of analysis would incorrectly measure sentence 
severity because these two types of punishments are considered equally severe.   The 
equality in severity prevents the development of a severity scale similar to some civilian 
sentencing studies (e.g. LaFree, 1985).  Thus, the better measures of sentence severity in 
military sentencing are (1) the decision to impose either the punitive discharge or 
confinement, and (2) the adjudged length of confinement.13    
 The decision to impose either a punitive discharge or confinement is a binary 
variable with the reference category including sentences without these two types of 
                                               
13 Supplemental analyses were performed using multinomial regression with a categorical dependent 
variable (lenient punishments, discharge only, confinement only, and both discharge and confinement); 
however, too few observations existed in the discharge only category to provide adequate statistical power 
for analysis (n=67).  Additionally, the multinomial model provided similar results to the binary model in 
the confinement only and confinement and discharge categories.  Thus, for parsimony, only the binary 
model is discussed and presented in this thesis.   
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punishments.  For instance, the sentence could include any combination of the less severe 
types of punishment such as hard labor without confinement and a reprimand.  The 
second dependent variable, confinement length, is a continuous variable measuring the 
number of confinement days for the subsample of offenders sentenced to confinement.  
The analysis uses days as opposed to months or years because military sentences for 
shorter confinement lengths (less than one year) have varying number of days.   Because 
confinement length is skewed to the right, the analysis is conducted on the logged 
confinement days.  
Independent Variable 
 The primary independent variable of interest for this study is the mode of 
conviction.  Operationalizing mode of conviction in the military justice system is not as 
simple as in some civilian court systems.  In military justice sentencing, the sentencing 
authority imposes one sentence for all of the charges rather than a sentence for each 
charge that runs concurrently or consecutively.  Consequently, offenders frequently enter 
“mixed pleas” in their cases meaning that offenders plead guilty for some charges and not 
others.  The types of pleas available on each charge are guilty, not guilty, and guilty to a 
lesser included offense.  For cases in which the offender pleads guilty to a lesser included 
offense without a plea agreement, a trial occurs on the more serious originally charged 
offense.  To determine mode of conviction, the present study examines the type of plea 
entered on the most serious offense charged and the choice of forum (jury or judge). 14  
Three dummy variables are generated  that represent whether the mode of conviction was 
                                               
14 The offender has to select jury or judge for both the guilt phase and sentencing phase.  He does not have 
the option to have a jury determine guilt and a judge determine sentence.  Thus, the mode of conviction 
dummy variables are not interactions, but they do capture the sentencing authority because the body that 
determines guilt also decides sentence.  “Choice of forum” is the phrase used by judge advocates to 
indicate the accused’s decision between a judge or jury.     
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a judge trial, jury trial, or jury guilty plea with judge guilty plea as the reference category.  
All negotiated plea cases are considered guilty pleas to account for charge reductions 
through the plea bargaining process.  Finally, because mode of conviction determines the 
sentencing authority, a separate variable for sentencing authority is not utilized.    
Control Variables 
 Extralegal and legal variables are included as control variables to isolate the 
effects of the mode of conviction.  This study uses legal control variables for offense 
type, offense severity, type of court, and criminal history.  Type of offense is a 
categorical variable developed based on a conversion table in Department of Defense 
Directive 7730.47-M that translates UCMJ offenses to the National Incident Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS) classification of offenses (see Appendix B).  The categories 
of offenses are person, property, drug, society, and military.15 Dummy variables are 
utilized for these offense categories with property as the reference category.16   
 Case severity is operationalized by the statutory maximum punishment of the 
most serious convicted offense, the number of counts, and the type of court.  Statutory 
seriousness is represented by an interval scale with a range of 1 to 21 based on the 
authorized maximum punishments in the UCMJ.   The scale captures the punitive 
discharge as well as the confinement maximum (see Appendix C).   The number of 
counts is the total number of convicted charges transformed by taking the natural 
                                               
15 NIBRS has an additional broad category, “person, society, property,” for hybrid offenses.  For this study, 
these offenses are collapsed into either person, society, or property depending on the nature of the offense. 
NIBRS does not have the military or drug categories.  Offenses that do not have a corresponding NIBRS 
code have been coded as a military offense.  Drug offenses are considered society offenses under NIBRS, 
but for this study, these offenses have been made a separate category.   
16 Due to the small number of observations in the military (n=146) and society (n=31) categories, these are 
collapsed into one category (“other”) for the analyses. 
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logarithm because each additional charge is likely to have less impact on sentence than 
the charge preceding it. 
  Type of court is a dummy variable indicating the court is a general court-martial 
as opposed to a special court-martial.  Cases adjudged in a special court-martial have an 
automatic sentence limitation of 12 months despite the maximum sentence authorized 
under the UCMJ.  Although no type of offense is required to be tried in a special or 
general court-martial, more serious cases are likely to be tried in a general court-martial 
because of the broader punishment range.  Controlling for the sentence limitation is also 
critical in comparing sentencing outcomes across all cases.  In Burchett (1983), court 
type was a significant predictor for sentence. 
 This study includes a measure of criminal history that is operationalized by a 
dummy variable indicating whether the offender has any prior convictions or 
administrative disciplinary actions.17  Because this study examines a military population, 
less than 2 percent of the sample includes individuals with at least one prior felony or 
court-martial conviction.  Few individuals are admitted into the military with a prior 
criminal record due to entrance qualification requirements (Landis et al., 1997).18  
Additionally, when a military member commits a crime, he is likely to be removed from 
the military through the discharge process (administratively or through court-martial).  
Nevertheless, military offenders may incur administrative actions for crimes such as 
AWOL, driving while intoxicated, underage drinking, and simple assault.  These 
administrative actions have relatively low evidentiary standards similar to probable cause 
                                               
17 A criminal history index and separate variables for each type of discipline were examined, but neither 
improved the model fit over a simple dummy variable indicating contact with the military justice system or 
civilian convictions.   
18 In fiscal year 2003, the Air Force admitted 5 applicants with felony convictions out of approximately, 
32,000 recruits (Department of Defense, 2007).   
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for civilian arrests and are considered an aggravating factor in sentencing.  Thus, the 
criminal history measure includes these administrative actions as well as prior 
convictions to better control for criminal history.   
 In addition to legal factors, prior studies have found extra-legal factors influence 
sentencing decisions, and thus, should be controlled to determine the effects of mode of 
conviction (see Zatz, 2000; Johnson, 2003; Kramer and Steffensmeier 1993; Spohn and 
Holleran, 2000). The extralegal variables represent individual offender characteristics for 
race, age, gender, and rank.  Race is operationalized with a dummy variable for black 
defendants and a dummy variable for other and unknown races with the reference 
category being white defendants.19  Age is a continuous variable representing age on the 
day the offender entered his plea.  Gender is a dummy variable indicating the offender is 
male with the reference category as female.   
 In the military, rank is a type of social status with the potential to affect the 
offender’s sentence and decision to plead guilty or go to trial.  A military offender’s rank 
includes an indicator of his income level as well as the degree of power and control he 
possesses within the military.  Similar to civilian studies that examine class effects in 
sentence, the income and power differential that rank represents is also likely to affect 
sentencing outcomes and the offender’s mode of conviction.  Thus, military rank is 
operationalized with a dummy variable indicating the offender is junior enlisted as 
opposed to a non-commissioned or commissioned officer.20 
                                               
19 The data only include race rather than ethnicity, thus, Hispanic could not be included in the analysis.  The 
“other race” category includes American Indian, Asian, and Hawaiian.  These cases were collapsed with 
the cases in which race is unknown because of the small number of observations.    
20 Ranks were collapsed into two categories due to the relatively small proportion of officers (0.04) and 
non-commissioned officers (0.22) in the sample.  Additionally, the junior enlisted have the least amount of 





 The analysis begins with a discussion of descriptive statistics, cross tabulations, 
and bivariate correlations to examine the relationships between the independent variables 
with each of the dependent variables.  To test the hypotheses, however, this study uses 
logistic regression and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  Two models are 
examined for each type of regression.  The first model is an aggregate measure of mode 
of conviction with a dummy variable indicating trial as opposed to guilty plea and a 
second dummy variable indicating jury as opposed to judge.  This simpler model 
provides a broad view of the trial and jury effects on sentencing outcomes.  The second 
model uses more specific mode of conviction dummy variables to examine the 
hypothesized relationships among the various modes of conviction categories. 
 Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable for the decision to impose a 
punitive discharge or confinement, many of the assumptions of the classical linear 
regression model are violated.  The generalized linear model of logistic regression, which 
uses maximum likelihood estimation rather than ordinary least squares, is necessary to 
examine the decision to impose a punitive discharge or confinement (Long, 1997).  For 
each of the models, the statistical significance and odds ratios are presented and 
interpreted.   To examine confinement length, the analysis uses ordinary least squares 
regression on the portion of the sample that received confinement.   
Sample Selection Bias 
 Sample selection bias is frequently a concern in sentencing research because of 
potential sample selection within the court process with the decisions to convict and to 
incarcerate.   Most sentencing studies do not account for the selection process in the 
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decision to convict and provide conditional estimates on the convicted subsample.  This 
weakness in prior research is due to the unavailability of acquittal data.  The present 
study does not have this data limitation.  Thus, the logistic regression results presented in 
this thesis include the acquittals to provide unconditional estimates of the independent 
variables.  Because acquittals do not result in punishment, they are coded as no 
punishment and included in the lenient punishment category of the binary dependent 
variable.  Although, the inclusion of acquittals in the logistic regression analysis accounts 
for sample selection resulting from the decision to convict, it is also correlated with the 
mode of conviction.  In other words, an acquittal is only possible for cases that go to trial.  
Supplemental analyses on the convicted subsample reveal substantively identical results 
for mode of conviction.  Consequently, the unconditional estimates, which include 
acquittals, are presented and discussed in this thesis for the logistic regression results.   
 The second potential source of sample selection occurs in the decision to 
incarcerate.  Over the last 20 years most sentencing research examining confinement 
length has attempted to correct for sample selection bias resulting from the decision to 
incarcerate (Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum, 2007).  Most frequently, a Heckman two-
step correction procedure has been utilized although other models such as Tobit have 
been used (e.g. Albonetti, 1991; Bushway and Piehl, 2001).  Nonetheless, a Heckman 
correction as opposed to conducting ordinary least squares regression on the incarcerated 
subsample is not always preferred because of the model’s sensitivity to assumption 
violations and high degrees of collinearity.  The correction can often do more harm than 
good when the amount of censoring is small (Bushway et al., 2007; Stolzenberg and 
Relles, 1997; Kennedy, 2003).  Heckman is especially vulnerable to collinearity when an 
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exclusion restriction is not included in the selection equation that is not also present in the 
primary equation resulting in instability.  Even in the absence of the exclusion restriction, 
the Heckman correction may be preferred if the regression equation with the independent 
variables is not sensitive to small changes in the data, which is measured with the 
condition number (Bushway et al., 2007).  When the condition number is less than 20, the 
corrected estimates may be preferable (Bushway et al., 2007).  In the present study, only 
13 percent of the convicted subsample did not receive confinement, the data do not 
include a possible exclusion restriction, and the condition number is 42 indicating an ill-
conditioned model.  Thus, given the unreliable estimates produced by the Heckman 
correction, the current study presents the uncorrected OLS estimates on the incarcerated 
subsample.   
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CHAPTER 5:  RESULTS 
 Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent 
variables used in the analyses.  The majority of cases were judge guilty pleas (60%) while 
the smallest proportion were judge trials (8%).  By collapsing categories according to 
jury/judge and trial/guilty plea, 31% of the sample consists of jury cases and 29% went to 
trial, indicating that overall jury and trial cases are the minority.21  The binary dependent 
variable indicates that 83% of the cases resulted in severe sentences (i.e. confinement or 
punitive discharge imposed).  Of the 272 cases that did not receive these severe 
punishments, 140 were acquittals.  Thus, an overwhelming majority (91%) of the 1,503 
convicted offenders received at least one of the most severe types of punishment.  For the 
continuous dependent variable, convicted offenders receive on average 382 days of 
confinement when confinement is imposed.   
                                               
21 In civilian studies with acquittal data, most cases that are prosecuted result in a guilty plea, however, the 
proportion of cases that go to trial is smaller in civilian courts compared to the proportion of trials in this 
Air Force sample (e.g. Holmes et al., 1992; LaFree, 1985; Smith, 1986).   
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Table 2.  Descriptives of Variables for Air Force Courts-Martial in 2005-2006 
Variable Coding       N %/Mean (SD) 
Dependent Variables    
Sentence Severitya 0  Lenient Punishments  272 16.6 
 1  Severe Punishments 1,371 83.4 
    
Confinement Length 
 (in days) Log transformation (0 – 9.8) 1,303 5.12 (1.11) 
    
Independent Variable    
Mode of Convictionb 0 Guilty Plea 1,164 71.3 
 1 Trial 468 28.7 
    
 0 Judge 1,120 68.6 
 1 Jury 512 31.4 
    
 0 Judge guilty plea 989 60.2 
 1 Judge trial 131   8.0 
 1 Jury guilty plea 175 10.7 
 1 Jury trial 337 20.5 
    
Control Variables    
Race 0 White 1,152 70.1 
 1 Black 332 20.2 
 1 Other/Unknown  159 9.7 
    
    
Gender 0 Female 201 12.2 
 1 Male 1,442 87.8 
    
Age Continuous (17.4 – 52.2) 1,643 25.6 (5.96) 
    
Rank 0 Officers  420 24.6 
 1 Enlisted 1,223 74.4 
    
Type of Court 0 Special Court-Martial 945 57.5 
 1 General Court-Martial 698 42.5 
    
Statutory Seriousness Interval Scale (1-21) 1,643 12.7 (3.38) 
    
Number of Counts Log transformation (0 – 3.9) 1,643 0.77 (0.73) 
    
Offense Typec 0 Property 274 16.7 
 1 Person 330 20.1 
 1 Drug 862 52.5 
 1 Other 177 10.8 
    
Criminal History 0 No Prior Discipline or Conviction 554 33.7 
 1 Prior Discipline or Conviction 889 54.1 
 1 Discipline/Conviction Missing 200 12.2 
    
Acquittals Convicted 1,503 91.5 
 Acquitted 140 8.5 
Total  1,643 100.0 
    
a  Lenient punishments include acquittals coded as no punishment as well as convicted offenders that did not receive a 
punitive discharge or confinement.  Severe punishments are sentences that include either a punitive discharge and/or 
confinement. 
b  Eleven cases are missing mode of conviction.  
c  “Other” consists of military and society offenses.    
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Cross Tabulations  
 Cross tabulations of the mode of conviction with the binary dependent variable 
indicate that between 73 and 97 percent of judge trials, jury guilty pleas, and judge guilty 
pleas receive either a punitive discharge and/or confinement, while only 48 percent of 
jury trial cases result in these types of punishments (see Table 3).  Additionally, a higher 
proportion of jury trials (33%) result in an acquittal compared to judge trials (21%).   
Even when acquittals are omitted, a lower proportion of jury trials (72%) receive severe 
punishments compared to judge guilty pleas (97%), judge trials (92%) and jury guilty 
pleas (82%).  This gives some indication initially that jury trial cases may not result in 
more severe types of punishment.   
 
Table 3: Cross Tabulations for Mode of Conviction, Sentence, and Acquittals 
 Acquittals Lenient  Punishment* 
Severe 
Punishment Total 
Mode of  
Conviction   n 
  %       n    %     n    %  n  % 
Judge Guilty Plea  0    0 28    2.8 961  97.2 989   60.2 
Judge Trial 27  20.6 8    6.1 96  73.3 131     8.0 
Jury Guilty Plea 0    0 31  17.7 144  82.3 175   10.7 
Jury Trial 110  32.6 64  19.0 163  48.4 337   20.5 
Missing  3  27.3 1    9.1 7  63.6 11     0.7 
Total 140    8.5 132   8.0 1371  83.4 1643  100.0 





 Prior to examining results from the multivariate regressions, bivariate correlations 
are also explored.  Table 4 provides the correlations for the binary (severe punishment) 
and continuous (logged confinement length) dependent variables with each of the 
independent variables.  These correlations indicate a negative correlation (-0.485) 
between jury trials and the likelihood of receiving a severe sentence, which is in the 
opposite direction of what is predicted.  Additionally, judge guilty pleas have a positive 
correlation (0.455), opposite of the predicted direction.  Similarly, the correlations for 
jury and trial are negative (-0.431 and -0.483, respectively).  For length of confinement, 
the correlations between mode of conviction types are much smaller, but more consistent 
with the hypothesized directions.  As predicted, trial and judge trial have positive 
correlations with length of confinement and jury guilty plea has a significant negative 
correlation.  Nevertheless, jury trial and judge guilty plea do not have significant 
relationships with the length of confinement.     
 The effect of acquittals on the correlations for the binary dependent variable and 
mode of conviction warrants some discussion because acquittals are only possible if the 
offender went to trial.  If acquittals are coded as no punishment, then the correlation with 
receiving a severe sentence will be more likely to be negative for trials.  Correlations on 
the convicted subsample reveal that although the size of the correlations are reduced, the 
direction remains negative for jury, trial, jury trial, and jury guilty plea (see Table 5).  
Additionally, jury guilty plea in the full sample does not have a significant correlation, 
but does in the convicted subsample (-0.115), and judge trials have a significant 
correlation in the full sample but not in the subsample.  Thus, inclusion of acquittals has 
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some affect on the bivariate correlations, however, they are not responsible for the failure 
to find correlations in the expected direction.   
 
   Table 4.  Bivariate Correlations for Full Samplea 
 Correlations with Dependent Variables 
Independent Variable Likelihood of Receiving  Discharge/Confinement 
(ln) Confinement Days 
Jury  - 0.431***  - 0.055** 
Trial  - 0.483***    0.071** 
Judge Guilty Plea    0.455***  - 0.005 
Judge Trial  - 0.082***    0.095*** 
Jury Guilty Plea  - 0.012  - 0.086*** 
Jury Trial  - 0.485***    0.010 
Age  - 0.165***    0.127*** 
Male  - 0.011    0.139*** 
White    0.039    0.023 
Black  - 0.028  - 0.014 
Other/Unknown Race  - 0.054**  - 0.041* 
Enlisted    0.156***  - 0.141*** 
General Court-Martial  - 0.011    0.528*** 
Statutory Seriousness    0.080***    0.495*** 
(ln) Counts    0.239***    0.409*** 
Property Offense    0.046*    0.040 
Person Offense  - 0.083***    0.370*** 
Drug Offense    0.107***  - 0.265*** 
Other Offense  - 0.120***  - 0.142*** 
Criminal History    0.116***    0.020 
  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed t-tests 
   a  The full sample is used for correlations with likelihood of receiving a severe sentence, and  
    the confinement subsample is used for correlations with logged confinement days.   
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   Table 5.  Bivariate Correlations for Mode of Conviction, Convicted Subsamplea 
 Correlations with Dependent Variables 
Independent Variable Likelihood of Receiving  Discharge/Confinement 
(ln) Confinement Days 
Jury  - 0.319***  - 0.055** 
Trial  - 0.245***    0.071** 
Judge Guilty Plea    0.293***  - 0.005 
Judge Trial    0.010    0.095*** 
Jury Guilty Plea  - 0.115***  - 0.086*** 
Jury Trial  - 0.291***    0.010 
   *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed t-tests 
   a Acquittals are removed  for correlations with likelihood of receiving a severe sentence, and  
     the confinement subsample is used for correlations with logged confinement days.   
 
 Correlations for the legal control variables for both dependent variables are 
overall in the expected direction, but General Court-Martial is negative and not 
significant, and Person Offense is significant in the opposite direction.22  However, when 
examining the length of confinement, most of the legal variables are positively and 
strongly correlated as would be expected.   
 The correlations for the extra-legal control variables largely do not reveal 
significant relationships with either of the dependent variables as would be expected. 
Contrary to findings in the civilian sentencing literature, the correlations are not 
statistically significant for gender and race in the likelihood of receiving a severe 
sentence (Zatz, 2000).   However, the lack of correlation for race is consistent with some 
of the military justice studies in the literature (Perry, 1977; Burchett, 1983; Verdugo, 
1998).  None of the prior military justice studies include women in their samples, but a 
positive correlation between male and sentence severity would be expected in the military 
                                               
22  This opposite direction for these two legal variables is likely due to inclusion of the acquittals because 
General Courts-Martial and Person Offenses are correlated with receiving an acquittal.  The bivariate 
correlations for the convicted subsample showed significant correlations of 0.051 for General Court-Martial 
and 0.048 for Person Offenses with the likelihood of receiving a severe type of sentence.    
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similar to civilian populations.  Although the correlation for length of confinement 
reveals a correlation more consistent with civilian sentencing literature for males (0.139), 
the correlation for the binary dependent variable is not significant.23    
Multivariate Results 
 Table 6 presents the results from the logistic regression model that examines the 
likelihood of receiving a sentence with a punitive discharge or confinement.   To see the 
overall effects of the offender’s plea and his choice of forum, this first model collapses 
mode of conviction into a dummy variable indicating whether the offender pled guilty or 
went to trial and a dummy variable for the offender’s choice of jury or judge.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that jury sentences compared to judge sentences will result in 
more severe sentences.  More specifically, jury cases should be more likely to impose 
sentences with the two most severe types of punishment (punitive discharge and 
confinement) than judges, controlling for legal and extra-legal factors.  According to the 
results in Table 6, clearly this is not the case.  Not only is the effect significant in the 
opposite predicted direction, but it is quite large.  For jury cases, the odds of receiving a 
severe type of punishment decrease by a factor of 0.16 when compared to judge cases.  In 
other words, the odds of receiving severe types of punishment are 6.43 times greater for 
judge cases than jury cases.  Hypotheses 3 and 4 predict that trials compared to guilty 
pleas will result in more severe sentences.  The results from Model 1 do not support these 
hypotheses because going to trial decreases the odds of receiving a severe punishment by 
a factor of 0.30 or 70 percent.  This initially provides a clear indication that not only does 
                                               
23 This lack of a relationship with the binary dependent variable is likely due to collapsing sentence types 
into a binary dependent variable.  Crosstabs show a higher proportion of females compared to males 
receive sentences with confinement only or punitive discharge only, while a lower proportion of females 
compared to males receive both types of punishment.     
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a trial penalty not exist when controlling for jury sentencing, but that jury sentencing also 
has a significant negative effect on sentence severity.24   
       Table 6.  Logistic Regression Results for Full Sample -- Model 1a 
Variable    Logit      z  Odds   Ratio 
Jury - 1.861*** - 8.11  0.16 
Trial - 1.220*** - 5.27  0.30 
Age   0.014 0.69  1.01 
Male - 0.318 - 1.08  0.73 
Black - 0.075 - 0.32  0.93 
Other/Unknown Race - 0.320 - 1.12  0.73 
Enlisted   0.741*** 2.62  2.10 
General Court-Martial   0.957*** 4.04  2.61 
Statutory Seriousness   0.061** 1.96  1.06 
(ln) Counts   0.984*** 5.79  2.68 
Person Offense   0.602* 1.72  1.83 
Drug Offense   0.900*** 3.00  2.46 
Other Offense - 0.550 - 1.61  0.58 
Criminal History   0.516** 2.33  1.67 
Constant   0.790 0.94      ---- 
N = 1632     
Log Likelihood - 380.443    
Pseudo R2 0.4780    
 * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests 
 a The model also includes a dummy variable for missing data in the criminal history variable.  
 Dummy variables were not included for the 11 cases missing mode of conviction because of 
 collinearity, thus, these observations were dropped from the analysis.   
 
 To more clearly see the relationship between jury and trial, Table 7 presents the 
results of the second logistic regression model that examines the four specific types of 
mode of conviction—judge guilty plea, judge trial, jury guilty plea, and jury trial.  The 
                                               
24 Results for the convicted subsample are substantively identical.  The odds ratio for jury is 0.13 and trial 
is 0.50 with p-values <0.01. 
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magnitudes and significance of the legal and extra-legal variables are very similar to 
Model 1, however, the relationships among the specific types of mode of conviction more 
clearly demonstrate that jury trials, jury guilty pleas, and judge trials all have 
significantly large negative effects on the probability of receiving a severe type of 
punishment when compared to judge guilty pleas.  Selecting a jury trial reduces the odds 
of receiving a severe sentence by a factor of 0.04 or 96 percent as opposed to pleading 
guilty with a judge.  Similarly, jury guilty pleas reduce the odds by 90 percent, and judge 
trials reduce the odds by 83 percent.   
 The legal factors—type of court-martial, statutory seriousness, number of counts, 
type of offense, and criminal history—are positively and significantly related to the 
likelihood of receiving a severe punishment.  The two legal factors that have the largest 
effect on the odds are the type of court and the logged number of counts.  General courts-
martial have a 2.67 times greater odds of receiving a punitive discharge or confinement 
than special courts-martial, and for a percentage increase in the number of counts, the 
odds increase by a factor of 2.69.  Although criminal history does not have the largest 
effect of the legal variables, it increases the odds of receiving a severe type of punishment 
by 69 percent.   Person offenses and statutory seriousness were expected to have larger 
effects, however, this is likely due to the inclusion of acquittals in the analysis.25  
                                               
25 In the convicted subsample, the p-values for person offense and statutory seriousness were less than 0.05 
in a two-tailed test and the odds ratios increased to 2.56 for person offense and 1.10 for statutory 
seriousness.   
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 The extra-legal factors revealed findings contrary to the civilian sentencing 
literature regarding the effects of race and gender, but are consistent with prior military 
justice studies.  The only significant factor is the offender’s rank indicating that junior 
enlisted offenders are more likely to receive severe types of punishment than non-
commissioned and commissioned officers.  Additionally, the logits for blacks and males 
are negative; however, these results should be taken with caution because they are not 
statistically significant.   
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              Table 7.  Logistic Regression Results for Cases Tried -- Model 2a 
Variable    Logit        z  Odds Ratio 
Jury Trial - 3.203*** - 11.95  0.04 
Jury Guilty Plea - 2.330*** - 7.44  0.10 
Judge Trial - 1.800*** - 5.17  0.17 
Age   0.016 0.79  1.02 
Male - 0.359 - 1.22  0.70 
Black - 0.102 - 0.43  0.90 
Other/Unknown Race - 0.319 - 1.11  0.73 
Enlisted   0.731*** 2.60  2.08 
General Court-Martial   0.983*** 4.17  2.67 
Statutory Seriousness   0.060* 1.93  1.06 
(ln) Counts   0.991*** 5.83  2.69 
Person Offense   0.621* 1.78  1.86 
Drug Offense   0.916*** 3.04  2.50 
Other Offense - 0.564 - 1.64  0.57 
Criminal History   0.523** 2.36  1.69 
Constant   0.978 1.16    --- 
N = 1632     
Log Likelihood - 378.03    
Pseudo R2 0.4813    
 * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed tests 
 a The model includes a dummy variable for missing data in criminal history.  Dummy 
 variables were not included for the 11 cases missing mode of conviction because of 




 In terms of the hypothesized relationships among the modes of conviction, Table 
8 presents the odds ratios with the change in reference category for mode of conviction.  
Hypotheses 1 through 4 are not supported and the effects are significant in the opposite 
direction with relatively large magnitudes.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that jury trial sentences 
will be more severe than judge trial sentences, yet, unequivocally the data do not support 
this.  Instead of increasing the odds of receiving a severe punishment, a jury trial 
decreases the odds by a factor of 0.25 or 75 percent.  In other words, the odds of 
receiving a severe punishment are 4 times greater for judge trials than jury trials.  
According to Hypothesis 2, jury guilty plea sentences should be more severe than judge 
guilty plea sentences, and as with Hypothesis 1, the opposite is found.  Jury guilty pleas 
decrease, instead of increase, the odds of receiving a severe punishment by factor of  
0.10.  Hypothesis 3 predicts that jury guilty plea sentences will be less severe than jury 
trial sentences, yet the data show the odds of receiving a severe punishment are 2.48 
times greater for jury guilty pleas than jury trials.  As with the jury cases, Hypothesis 4 
predicts judge guilty plea sentences will be more lenient than judge trial sentences.  The 
data, however, show that judge guilty pleas increase the odds of receiving a severe 
sentence by a factor of 6.04.  Finally, according to Hypothesis 5, no significant difference 
is expected between judge trial and jury guilty plea sentences.  In examining the types of 
punishments imposed, this hypothesis found some support.  However, for this particular 
hypothesis, the inclusion of acquittals in the analyses alters the results.26  In a 
supplemental analysis of the convicted subsample, judge trials are significantly (p<0.05) 
more likely to result in severe punishments compared to jury guilty pleas (odds ratio 
                                               
26 The results for Hypotheses 1-4 were substantively identical in the convicted subsample analysis and  
showed significant effects in the opposite predicted directions.   
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2.93).  This further supports the importance of including acquittals in a trial penalty 
analyses.  A trial penalty appears to be present when comparing judge trials and jury 
guilty pleas when the estimates are conditional on being convicted.      
 
      Table 8.  Odds Ratios for Mode of Conviction Comparisonsa 
Mode of Conviction Comparisons    Logit      z  Odds Ratio 
Jury Trial vs. Judge Trial (H1) - 1.404*** - 4.66  0.25 
Jury GP  vs. Judge GP (H2) - 2.330*** - 7.44  0.10 
Jury GP vs.  Jury Trial (H3)   0.873*** 3.21  2.40 
Judge GP vs. Judge Trial (H4)   1.800*** 5.17  6.04 
Judge Trial vs. Jury GP (H5)   0.531 1.44  1.70 
 ***p<0.01, two-tailed test 
 a The same model that produced the results in Table 7 was used to produce these results with 
 only the reference category for mode of conviction changed. 
 
 In addition to the probability of receiving a punitive discharge or confinement, 
this thesis also examines the length of confinement when imposed.  As in the initial 
logistic regression analysis, Model 3 aggregates the mode of conviction (see Table 9), 
and the second model shows the more detailed mode of conviction categories (see Tables 
10 and 11).27  Both models explain almost half of the variance in logged confinement 
lengths.   
                                               
27 A Heckman two-step model to correct for selection bias was also explored but had a high degree of 
multicollinearity and was particularly high for mode of conviction.  Additionally, the inverse mills ratio 
was insignificant (p>0.05) indicating no selection bias.  Nonetheless, it should be noted that the corrected 




         Table 9.  OLS Regression Results for (ln)Length of Confinement, 
  Confinement Subsample, Model 3a     
Variable      b     t     β 
Jury - 0.284*** - 4.01 - 0.104 
Trial - 0.100 - 1.19 - 0.034 
Age   0.004 0.60 0.020 
Male   0.113* 1.70 0.033 
Black - 0.010 - 0.18 - 0.004 
Other/Unknown Race   0.065 - 0.69 0.168 
Enlisted - 0.068 - 0.84 - 0.025 
General Court-Martial   0.719*** 13.74 0.321 
Statutory Seriousness   0.100*** 10.36 0.289 
(ln)Counts   0.336*** 9.80 0.224 
Person Offense   0.367*** 4.18 0.131 
Drug Offense - 0.134** - 2.29 - 0.060 
Other Offense - 0.080 - 0.83 - 0.020 
Criminal History   0.110** 2.24 0.047 
Constant   3.073 11.20       --- 
N = 1297    
R2 0.4942   
   * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001, two-tailed tests 
 a The model also includes a dummy variable for missing data in criminal history.  Dummy 
 variables were not included for the 11 cases missing mode of conviction because of 
 collinearity, thus, these observations were dropped from the analysis.    
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 Table 10.  OLS Regression Results for (ln) Length of Confinement, 
   Confinement Subsample, Model 4a 
Variable     b          t    β 
Jury Trial - 0.326*** - 3.52 - 0.092 
Jury Guilty Plea - 0.376*** - 4.66 - 0.100 
Judge Trial - 0.218* - 1.94 - 0.051 
Age   0.005 0.66 0.022 
Male   0.108 1.63 0.032 
Black - 0.020 - 0.31 - 0.006 
Other/Unknown Race   0.061 0.65 0.016 
Enlisted - 0.071 - 0.88 - 0.026 
General Court-Martial   0.723*** 13.77 0.323 
Statutory Seriousness   0.100*** 10.39 0.288 
(ln) Counts   0.337*** 9.83 0.225 
Person Offense   0.366*** 4.16 0.130 
Drug Offense - 0.138** - 2.35 - 0.062 
Other Offense - 0.087 - 0.91 - 0.022 
Criminal History   0.106** 2.20 0.047 
Constant   3.086 11.34    --- 
N = 1297    
R2  0.4958   
  * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001, two-tailed tests 
 a The model also includes a dummy variable for missing data in criminal history.  Dummy 
 variables were not included for the 11 cases missing mode of conviction because of 
 collinearity, thus, these observations were dropped from the analysis.   
 
 
 Similar to the logistic regression models examining type of punishment, the legal 
factors in both OLS models are positive and significant.  For instance, in Model 3, being 
tried in a general court-martial increases the length of confinement by 72 percent, and 
person offense compared to property offense increases the length of confinement by 37 
percent.  In contrast to the logistic regression models, however, the extra-legal variables 
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reveal that males receive significantly longer lengths of confinement while rank has no 
significant effect.   In Model 3, jury continues to have a significant, negative effect that 
decreases the length of confinement by 28 percent, but trial has no significant effect.  In 
other words, when controlling for whether an offender is tried and convicted by a jury, 
there is no significant difference between guilty pleas and trials in the percentage change 
in confinement length.  Thus, although in Model 1 trials are less likely than guilty pleas 
to result in a punitive discharge or confinement, when confinement is imposed, Model 3 
shows the confinement length is no more severe in trials than in guilty pleas.   
 The mode of conviction variable is further refined in Model 4 and the results are 
presented in Table 10.   With judge guilty plea as the reference category, jury trial and 
jury guilty plea are significant and in the negative direction.  Judge trial is also negative 
but not significant.  Compared to judge guilty pleas, jury trials decrease the length of 
confinement by 33 percent and jury guilty pleas decrease the length by 38 percent. 
 For ease of comparison in terms of the hypothesized relationships, Table 11 
presents the mode of conviction coefficients with the reference category changed.  
Similar to the logistic regression models, Hypotheses 1 through 4 are not supported.  If 
Hypothesis 1 were supported, then confinement length would be significantly longer for 
jury trials than judge trials, however, the results show no significant difference between 
jury and judge trial sentences.  Hypothesis 2 predicts that jury guilty pleas will result in 
more severe sentences than judge guilty pleas, but the data show that jury guilty pleas 
reduce confinement length by 38 percent rather than increase it.   Hypotheses 3 and 4 
predict that trials will result in more severe sentences than guilty pleas among jury cases 
(H3) and judge cases (H4).  Yet, no significant differences are found between the 
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confinement lengths imposed in guilty pleas in trials for jury as well as judge cases.  
Unlike Hypotheses 1 through 4, Hypothesis 5 has some support because it predicted there 
would be no significant difference between judge trial and jury guilty plea sentences.  
Thus, as in the decision to impose a severe punishment, there is no significant difference 
in the logged sentence lengths when comparing jury guilty pleas and judge trials.   
 
       Table 11.  OLS Regression Results--Mode of Conviction Comparisonsa 
Mode of Conviction Comparisons     b             t   β 
Jury Trial vs. Judge Trial (H1) - 0.108 - 0.77 - 0.030 
Jury GP  vs. Judge GP (H2) - 0.376** - 4.66 - 0.100 
Jury GP vs.  Jury Trial (H3) - 0.050 - 0.42 -0.013 
Judge GP vs. Judge Trial (H4)   0.218*  1.94 0.088 
Judge Trial vs. Jury GP (H5)   0.157  1.18 0.037 
    *p<0.10; **p<0.001, two-tailed tests 
     aThe same model that produced the results in Table 10 was used to produce these  






CHAPTER 6:  DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
 According to the organizational efficiency perspective, court actors induce guilty 
pleas to reduce the use of court resources resulting in a process discount for offenders 
who plead guilty (Dixon, 1995; Engen and Steen, 2000; e.g. King and Noble, 2004, 2005; 
King et al., 2005).  An aspect of the court community perspective that also argues for a 
trial penalty or process discount effect is that the court community develops “going rates” 
based on workgroup interactions in past cases to reduce uncertainty in the outcome and to 
facilitate plea bargaining (Ulmer, 1997; Eisenstein and Jacobs, 1977; Eisenstein et al., 
1988; Nardulli et al., 1988).  Consistent with the notion of a going rate, uncertainty 
avoidance posits that judges use “patterned responses” when faced with more limited 
information regarding the likelihood of future offending and will make situational 
imputations from case and offender characteristics that may produce a trial penalty effect 
(Ulmer and Bradley, 2006).  Taken together then, these theoretical perspectives suggest 
that offenders will be rewarded with less severe sentences when they select a mode of 
conviction that reduces uncertainty for the court actors and minimizes court resources.  
Although the present study is exploratory in nature, it applied these theoretical 
perspectives to military sentencing—a jury sentencing court system—in order to test 
these propositions.   
 Contrary to the majority of trial penalty studies, the present study found no 
support for its hypotheses which predicted a trial penalty effect.  Because judges are 
likely to use going rates and promote organizational efficiency, judge trials and judge 
guilty pleas should have resulted in less severe sentences than jury trials (H1) and jury 
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guilty pleas (H2).  The results of this study found no support for these hypotheses and 
found that sentences imposed by juries are less likely to include the two most severe 
types of punishment, punitive discharge and confinement.  Furthermore, when 
confinement is imposed, the lengths of confinement for jury guilty pleas are less than 
judge guilty pleas.    
 These interesting findings initially suggest the availability of jury sentencing is a 
key component in whether a trial penalty exists and how the court community develops 
its going rates.   Prior jury sentencing research in non-capital cases revealed mixed 
findings regarding whether judges impose more or less severe sentences than juries 
(Weninger, 1994; King and Noble, 2005, 2006).  In King and Noble (2005), the 
prosecutors in Virginia indicated that they take into consideration the sentences that juries 
impose when plea bargaining, however, the prosecutors in Arkansas also acknowledged 
that jury sentences for particular types of offenses are generally lower than the going 
rates for negotiated pleas.  Given the empirical findings in the present study and the 
mixture of evidence in prior jury sentencing research, the court community may have its 
own view of what is an appropriate punishment.   
 As in the civilian jury sentencing jurisdictions, the difference in information 
regarding collateral consequences of sentences has been asserted as a source of disparity 
between judge and jury sentences in the military.  In 1983-84, Congress explored the 
possibility of removing jury sentencing from military courts among other major reforms 
to the UCMJ.  A Congressional Advisory Commission conducted a large scale survey of 
judge advocates that included judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys as well as 
convening authorities (Department of Defense, 1984).  The study revealed that most 
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members of the military legal community believe that jury members impose 
inappropriate sentences.  Additionally, testimony and position papers confirm a firmly 
held perception exists that jury sentences are too lenient because they do not understand 
the collateral consequences of their sentences such as good time credit, parole, and the 
administrative discharge process (Department of Defense, 1984; see also Vowell, 
1986).28   Thus, some qualitative evidence supports the idea that the military legal 
community disregards the sentences imposed by juries and develops its own going rates 
independent of jury sentences.   
 Although the development of going rates may account for the finding that judges 
impose more severe sentences than juries, this cannot explain why among jury sentences 
(H3), trials are less likely to include a severe punishment and the lengths of confinement 
are no different between guilty pleas and trials.  Even though juries do not impose the 
court community’s going rates, military juries should provide some discount in sentence 
for guilty pleas (H3).  Military juries are likely to have an organizational resource 
concern and are instructed by the court to consider in mitigation that a guilty plea saves 
the government time and expense.  Nevertheless, the data clearly do not support this 
hypothesis.   
 A few possible explanations exist for this null finding.  First, military juries likely 
do not have the same sense for the community punishment norm as judges might for the 
court community’s going rates.  If juries have no true sense for the average sentence 
imposed in similar trial cases, then it would be difficult for them to impose a less severe 
                                               
28 Although the current study’s methodology is quantitative, I also interviewed former and current Air 
Force judge advocates regarding their perceptions of judge and jury sentencing and found that the 
perceptions present in the 1983 Congressional Report continue to exist in the Air Force judge advocate 
community.     
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sentence.  In other words, guilty plea jurors may think they are imposing a discount but 
they have no frame of reference from which to calculate the discount.  Another possible 
explanation may be related to the group dynamics inherent in jury decision-making.  In a 
trial, jurors must first find the offender guilty before deciding punishment.  Despite a 
finding of guilt, some jurors may not be as firmly convinced of guilt as other jurors.  As a 
result, these jurors may argue during the sentencing phase that the conviction is 
punishment enough.  The 1983 Congressional study found support for a perception 
among judge advocates that jury sentences are the product of a “compromise” between 
the guilt and sentencing phases in cases with weaker evidence.29  This argument would 
then suggest that strength of the evidence may be an important factor to control and is a 
limitation of the data in the current study worthy of exploration in future military 
sentencing studies.    
 Even though the findings for jury cases may be the result of data limitations, 
judge sentences are not subject to the group decision-making process like juries, and thus, 
cannot explain why judges impose more severe sentences in guilty pleas than trials.  
From an organizational efficiency perspective, judges should reward offenders with less 
severe sentences for guilty pleas than trials (H4).  However, the data show that the odds 
of receiving a sentence with one of the two most severe types of punishments are 6.04 
times greater for judge guilty pleas than judge trials, and when confinement is adjudged, 
the sentence is 22 percent longer.   
                                               
29 I found this same perception among the judge advocates I interviewed.  They believed this most 
frequently occurred in close cases such as sexual assault cases without strong physical evidence.  
Unfortunately, the data for this study did not include a measure for strength of the evidence, so this could 
not be examined quantitatively.   
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 Most of the prior sentencing studies that include an analysis of judge trials (aka 
“bench trials”) have found a trial penalty effect compared to guilty pleas, although a few 
studies have either found no difference or an opposite effect as in the present research 
(King et al., 2005).  This finding suggests several possibilities in how military judges 
arrive at a sentence.  First, if judges apply going rates determined by the court 
community, then the going rate or patterned response that judges use in guilty pleas may 
not represent a sentencing floor as it might in civilian courts.  Second, after a bench trial, 
judges may feel freer to deviate from the court community norms than in guilty pleas.30  
By imposing the going rate in a guilty plea, judges encourage offenders to plead guilty 
and convening authorities to enter into plea agreements by reducing uncertainty in the 
outcome rather than through less severe sentences.  Hence, judges may still be imposing 
the going rate for organizational efficiency reasons because offenders are induced to 
plead guilty through uncertainty reduction, not a process discount.31  Regardless, this 
finding is particularly interesting and should be explored in future military sentencing 
research.   
 Finally, if jury guilty pleas and judge trials each have some degree of efficiency 
and uncertainty reduction, then the sentences adjudged after these modes of conviction 
should be no less or more severe than the other (H5).  This hypothesis was the only one 
in which I found some support.  The type of punishment and confinement length analysis 
both showed no significant difference in judge trial and jury guilty plea sentences.   
                                               
30 Interviews with judge advocates indicated a belief that when judges determine sentences in cases with 
plea agreements, they attempt to impose sentences close to the agreed upon sentence limitation.  Judge 
advocates even refer to this as “hitting the cap.”  Thus, in bench trials, judges may feel less constrained in 
determining sentence.     
31 Former defense attorneys indicated that despite advising their clients that they would be more likely to 
receive harsher punishments with a negotiated guilty plea before a judge, their clients insisted on the 
certainty that accompanies a pretrial agreement as an “insurance policy.”     
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Conclusion   
  Research on military sentencing is virtually non-existent in the sentencing 
literature, and the studies that been published focus on the effects of race in sentencing 
rather than the trial penalty.  Although the civilian sentencing literature generally 
supports the existence of a trial penalty, research has been limited to court systems 
without jury sentencing.  The present study expands on the military justice and civilian 
sentencing literature by exploring whether a trial penalty or process discount exists in 
military courts.  Unlike prior military sentencing research, this study also applies 
theoretical sentencing perspectives found in the civilian sentencing literature.   
 The results from the present study indicate little support for a trial penalty in 
military sentencing.  Furthermore, significant and consistent findings in the opposite 
direction challenge the idea that guilty pleas are induced solely through reductions in 
sentence as suggested by the organizational efficiency model.  Although sentence 
reductions may induce guilty pleas in civilian jurisdictions, clearly this is not the case in 
the Air Force population.  Nevertheless, in civilian jurisdictions, the offender’s desire for 
certainty should not be discounted as the primary motivation for negotiated guilty pleas.  
Because of the manner in which jury sentencing is utilized in the military, an offender’s 
desire for certainty may be more apparent quantitatively in military sentencing than in 
civilian jurisdictions.  Thus, given the large proportion of guilty pleas (71%), this study 
challenges the notion that guilty pleas are induced solely through plea rewards as 
suggested by the organizational efficiency hypothesis.   
 The findings in this study also suggest that further research should be conducted 
on how court communities develop going rates in jury sentencing jurisdictions.  The jury 
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and judge sentencing differences indicate that Air Force court communities develop 
going rates independent of the punishments imposed by juries.  Whether this is true only 
for the Air Force, applies to the entire military, or is characteristic of all jury sentencing 
jurisdictions is unknown.   
 Although some qualitative evidence exists that all of the services develop going 
rates independent of the sentences juries impose, the results of the current research are 
not generalizable to the Army, Marines, and Navy and is a limitation of this study.  
Sentences in general may vary significantly because of differences in the military 
populations across branches of service.  For instance, the Air Force has a smaller 
population than the Army (316,616 vs. 499,543), and has fewer members with a prior 
criminal record (Department of Defense, 2007; Defense Manpower Data Center, 2006).  
Furthermore, certain types of crimes may occur more frequently in some branches as 
opposed to others due to service specific policies, military cultural norms, and individual 
characteristics of their recruits.  Therefore, future research should be conducted with data 
from other branches of the military before drawing any definitive conclusions about the 
existence of a trial penalty in military sentencing.   
 Despite this study’s limitations, it has interesting public policy implications 
especially for the military justice system.  Congress revises portions of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice every year with some years encompassing broader changes than 
others.  Whether to retain the right to jury sentencing is frequently debated and many 
members in the military legal community advocate abolishment because of the alleged 
disparity it causes in sentences for similarly situated offenders (Jackson, 2004; 
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Department of Defense, 1984).32  According to the current research, a great deal of 
disparity is attributable to the mode of conviction differences, with jury trials and jury 
guilty pleas resulting in less severe punishment.  Nonetheless, jury sentencing has a long 
history in the military system, and military tradition is not likely to be abandoned without 
something more persuasive than “juries are too soft.”  The current study shows a 
disconnect exists between what legal professionals and juries view as appropriate 
punishments.  From a public policy perspective, the cause for this difference of opinion 
may be worth exploring before deciding whether to abandon jury sentencing.  Are jury 
sentences truly reflective of the military community’s punishment norms or would jury 
sentences become more severe in light of information about parole eligibility, good time 
credit, and the administrative discharge process?33  
 Furthermore, the lack of a trial penalty effect in the military also has potential 
public policy implications for civilian courts.  If this finding is due to sentencing process 
differences (jury sentencing in particular), then changes in civilian court systems to more 
closely resemble military processes may alleviate a trial penalty effect.  However, these 
results should be taken with extreme caution when attempting to make comparisons 
between military and civilian populations.  In the Air Force data, less than 2 percent of 
the offenders had a prior felony or court-martial conviction.  Thus, in essence this study 
of military sentencing may be limited to a population of less serious offenders that cannot 
be compared to a civilian study which is likely to include a much higher proportion of 
                                               
32 Although not the subject of this study, the data showed little evidence of disparity according to extra-
legal factors such as race, gender, and age, and the significant rank effect was found in judge as well as jury 
cases.  
33 When reviewing the records of trial, I often found that jurors had asked the court questions surrounding 
parole eligibility, good time credit, and administrative discharge proceedings, but the court-martial rules 
prohibit jurors from considering these collateral issues.   
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offenders with prior records.  Moreover, some studies have found that the presence of a 
trial penalty is more pronounced for offenders with substantial criminal histories (e.g. 
Smith, 1986; Ulmer, 1997).  Therefore, the lack of a trial penalty effect in the military 
population could be due more to the military and civilian population differences than any 
difference in the court systems.   
 Although the present study is hardly adequate to fill the gaping hole in the 
literature on military courts, it serves as a valuable stepping stone for future research on 
military sentencing.  Furthermore, this research provides more insight into the trial 
penalty as well as highlights potential weaknesses and limitations in the scope of existing 






Appendix A:  Punishment Type Combinations 
 
1 Punitive Discharge     
2 Confinement     
3 Reduce Rank     
4 Financiala     
5 Restraint/not
b 
confinement     
6 Punitive Discharge Confinement    
7 Punitive Discharge Reduce Rank    
8 Punitive Discharge Financial    
9 Punitive Discharge Restraint/not confinement    
10 Punitive Discharge Confinement Reduce Rank   
11 Punitive Discharge Confinement Financial   
12 Punitive Discharge Confinement Restraint/not confinement   
13 Punitive Discharge Confinement Reduce Rank Financial  
14 Punitive Discharge Confinement Reduce Rank Restraint/ not confinement  
15 Punitive Discharge Confinement Restraint/not confinement Financial  
16 Punitive Discharge Confinement Reduce Rank Financial Restraint/not confinement 
17 Punitive Discharge Reduce Rank Financial   
18 Punitive Discharge Reduce Rank Financial Restraint/not confinement  
19 Punitive Discharge Reduce Rank Restraint/not confinement   
20 Punitive Discharge Financial Restraint/not confinement   
21 Confinement Reduce Rank    
22 Confinement Financial    
23 Confinement Restraint/ not confinement    
24 Confinement Reduce Rank Financial   
25 Confinement Reduce Rank Financial Restraint/ not confinement  
26 Confinement Financial Restraint/ not confinement   
27 Confinement Reduce Rank Restraint/not confinement   
28 Reduce Rank Financial    
29 Reduce Rank Financial Restraint /not confinement   
30 Reduce Rank Restraint/ not confinement    
31 Restraint/not  confinement Financial    
32 No Punishment/Reprimand 
a  Forfeiture of pay and fines 
b Restriction to base and hard labor without confinement
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Appendix B:  Offense Type Classification  
UCMJ  Offense 
  PERSON OFFENSES 
090-A1 Striking or assaulting a superior commissioned officer 
090-A2 Striking or assaulting a superior commissioned officer in time of war 
091-A1 Striking or assaulting warrant officer by warrant officer or enlisted 
091-A2 Striking or assaulting superior NCO by warrant officer or NCO 
091-A3 Striking or assaulting other NCO by warrant officer or NCO 
095-A- Resisting apprehension 
097--- Unlawful apprehension, arrest, or confinement of another 
114--- Dueling 
117--- Provoking speeches or gestures 
118-A- Premeditated murder 
118-B- Murder with intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm 
118-C- Kiling another when engaged in an inherently dangerous act 
118-D- 
Killing another when engaged in the perpetration of burglary, sodomy, 
rape, robbery, or aggravated arson 
119-A- Voluntary manslaughter 
119-B1 Involuntary manslaughter 
119-B2 
Involuntary manslaughter when engaged in perpetration of burglary, 
sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson 
120-A- Rape 
120-B1 Carnal knowledge-child 12 to 16 years of age 
120-B2 Carnal knowledge-child under 12 years of age 
124--- Maiming 
125-A- Forcible sodomy 
125-B1 Sodomy with a child 12 to 16 years of age 
125-B2 Sodomy with a child under 12 years of age 
128-A- Simple assault 
128-A1 Assault with a dangerous weapon 
128-B- Assault consummated by a battery 
128-C- Assault upon a commissioned officer not in the execution of his office 
128-D- Assault upon a warrant officer not in the execution of his office 
128-E- 
Assault upon a noncommissioned or petty officer not in execution of 
office 
128-F- Assault upon a person in the execution of law enforcement duties 
128-G- Assault consummated by a battery upon a child under the age of 16 
128-H1 
Assault with a firearm with intent to produce death or grievous bodily 
harm 
128-H2 
Assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to produce death or 




Assault in which grievous bodily harm is intentionally inflicted, with a 
firearm 
128-J2 
Assault in which grievous bodily harm is intentionally inflicted, with 
or without a weapon 
134-- Possession of Child Pornography 
134-- Receipt of Child Pornography 
134-C1 Assault-indecent 
134-C2 Assault-with intent to commit murder 
134-C3 Assault-with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter 
134-C4 Assault-with intent to commit rape 
134-C5 Assault-with intent to commit robbery 
134-C6 Assault-with intent to commit sodomy 
134-C7 Assault-with intent to commit housebreaking 
134-C8 Assault-with intent to commit burglary 
134-C9 Homicide, negligent 
134-N4 Reckless endangerment 
134-R1 Indecent acts or liberties with child under the age of 16 
134-R2 Indecent exposure 
134-R3 
Indecent language--communicating indecent language to a child under 
16 
134-R5 Indecent or lewd acts with another 
134-S1 Kidnapping 
134-X1 Bomb threat 
134-X2 Threat, communicating 
134-Y0 Computer crimes in violation of state law 
  PROPERTY OFFENSES 
092A11 Fail to obey general order:  Misuse of Government Purchase Card 
092-A2 Fail to obey general order:  Black marketing activities 
103-B1 
Failure to report or turn over captured or abandoned property-$100 or 
less 
103-B2 
Failure to report or turn over captured or abandoned property-more 
than $100 
103-C1 Dealing in captured or abandoned property-$100 or less 
103-C2 Dealing in captured or abandoned property-more than $100 
103-D- Looting or pillaging 
108-A1 Selling or disposing of military property-$500 or less 
108-A2 Selling or disposing of military property-more than $500 
108-A3 Selling or disposing of military property-Firearm or Explosive 
108-B1 Suffering military property to be lost, damaged, destroyed-$500 or less 
108-B2 
Suffering military property to be lost, damaged, destroyed-more than 
$500 
108-C1 Damaging, destroying, or losing military property-$500 or less 




Damaging, destroying, or losing military property-Firearm or 
Explosive 
109-A1 
Wasting, spoiling, destroying, or damaging non-military property-
$500 or less 
109-A2 
Wasting, spoiling, destroying, or damaging non-military property-
more than $500 
109-B1 Destroying or damaging non-military property-$500 or less 
109-B2 Destroying or damaging non-military property-more than $500 
110-A- Hazarding of vessel-willful 
110-B- Hazarding of vessel-neglect 
121-A1 Larceny of military property of a value of $500 or less 
121-A2 Larceny of military property of a value of more than $500 
121-B1 Larceny of non-military property of a value of $500 or less 
121B1A 
Larceny of non-military property $500 or less:  Misuse of Govt 
purchase card 
121-B2 Larceny of non-military property more than $500 
121B2A 
Larceny of non-military property more than $500:  Misuse of Govt 
purchase card 
121-C1 Wrongful appropriation of property of value less than $500 
121-C2 Wrongful appropriation of property of value more than $500 
121-C3 Wrongful appropriation of motor vehicle, aircraft or vessel 
122-A- Robbery with a firearm 
122-B- Robbery 
123-A- Forgery-falsely making or altering a signature or any part of a writing 
123AA1 Worthless check in the amount of $500 or less, with intent to defraud 
123AA2 
Worthless check in the amount of more than $500 with intent to 
defraud 
123AB- Worthless check with intent to deceive 
123-B- 
Forgery--uttering, offering, issuing, or transferring a falsely made or 
altered writing 
126-A- Aggravated arson:  structure 
126-B1 Simple arson where the property is of a value of $500 or less 




132-A- Making a false or fraudulent claim against the U.S. 
132-B- Presenting a false or fraudulent claim against the U.S. 
132-C- Fraud:  False document with claim 
132-D- Fraud:  False oath in connection with claim 
132-E- Fraud:  Forgery of signature 
132-F- Fraud:  Use forged signature 
132-G1 Paying amount less than called for by receipt-$500 or less 
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132-G2 Paying amount less than called for by receipt-more than $500 
132-H1 Making receipt without knowledge of the facts-$500 or less 
132-H2 Making receipt without knowledge of the facts-more than $500 
134-D1 Bribery and graft 
134-E1 Burning with intent to defraud 
134-F1 
Check-making and uttering worthless check, by dishonorably failing to 
maintain funds 
134-H1 Debt, dishonorably failing to pay 
134-K1 False or unauthorized pass/permit/ID:  Wrongful making, altering 
134-K2 False or unauthorized pass/permit/ID:  Wrongful sale, gift, etc 
134-K3 False or unauthorized pass/permit/ID:  Wrongful use or possession 
134-K4 False or unauthorized document-other cases 
134-L1 False pretenses, obtaining services of value $500 or less 
134-L2 False pretenses, obtaining services of value more than $500 
134-Q1 
Impersonating an officer, warrant officer, or NCO with intent to 
defraud 
134-Q2 
Impersonating an officer, warrant officer, or NCO with no intent to 
defraud 
134-Q3 Other wrongful impersonations with intent to defraud 
134-Q4 Other wrongful impersonations with no intent to defraud 
134-T1 Mail-destroy, steal, take or open 
134-T3 Mail:  other offenses 
134-U5 Public record:  altering, concealing, removing, mutilating 
134-V1 Unlawful entry 
134-V2 Property:  Unlawful seizure, destruction or removal 
134-V3 Stolen property:  knowingly receiving-$500 or less 
134-V4 Stolen property: knowingly receiving-more than $500 
  DRUG OFFENSES 
092-A4 Fail to obey general order:  Possession of drug paraphernalia 
112AA1 
Wrongful possession of amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, Sch I,II,III 
controlled substance 
112AA2 Wrongful possession of Sch IV or V controlled substance 
112AA3 Wrongful possession of marijuana less than 30 grams 
112AA4 Wrongful possession of marijuana more than 30 grams 
112AB1 
Wrongful possession with intent to distribute amphetamine, cocaine, 
etc.  
112AB2 
Wrongful possession with intent to distribute Sch IV or  V controlled 
substance 
112AB3 Wrongful possession with intent to distribute marijuana 
112AC1 
Wrongful use of amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, Sch 1, II, III 
controlled substance 
112AC2 Wrongful use of Sch IV or V controlled substance 




Distribution of amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, Sch 1, II, III controlled 
substance 
112AD2 Distribution of Sch IV or V controlled substance 
112AD3 Distribution of marijuana 
112AE1 
Manufacture of amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, Sch I, II, III controlled 
substance 
112AE2 Manufacture of Sch IV or V controlled substance 
112AE3 Manufacture of marijuana 
112AF1 
Manufacture with intent to distribute of amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, 
Sch I, II, III controlled substance 
112AF2 
Manufacture with intent to distribute of Sch IV or V controlled 
substance 
112AF3 Manufacture with intent to distribute marijuana 
112AG1 
Wrongful introduction amphetamine,  cocaine, heroin, Sch1, II, III 
controlled substance 
112AG2 Wrongful introduction Sch IV or V controlled substance 
112AG3 Wrongful introduction of marijuana 
112AH1 
Wrongful introduction with intent to distribute amphetamine, cocaine, 
heroin, Sch I, II, III 
112AH2 
Wrongful introduction with intent to distribute Sch IV or V controlled 
substance 
112AH3 Wrongful introduction with intent to distribute marijuana 
112AI1 
Wrongful importation or exportation of Sch I, II, III controlled 
substances into US 
112AI2 
Wrongful importation or exportation of Sch IV or V controlled 
substances into US 
112AI3 Wrongful importation or exportation of marijuana into US 
  SOCIETY OFFENSES 
092-A9 Fail to obey general order:  Possession of unauthorized weapons 
095-B- Breaking arrest 
095-C- Escape from custody 
095-D1 Escape from pretrial confinement 
095-D2 Escape from post trial confinement 
096-A- Releasing a prisoner without proper authority 
096-B1 Suffering a prisoner to escape through neglect 
096-B2 Suffering a prisoner to escape through design 
106--- Spying 
106-A- Espionage 
111-A1 Drunken driving resulting in personal injury 
111-A2 Drunken driving otherwise 
111-B1 Reckless driving resulting in personal injury 
111-B2 Reckless driving otherwise 




116-B- Breach of the peace 
125-C- Sodomy-other cases 
131-A- Giving false testimony-perjury 




134-B6 Compelling, inducing, enticing, or procuring act of prostitution 
134-G5 Violation of Parole 
134-G6 Allowing prisoner to do unauthorized act 
134-J0 Drunkenness--incapacitation for performance of duties 
134-J1 Drunk on station 
134-J2 Drunk under circumstances to bring discredit upon the military 
134-J3 Drunk and disorderly on station 
134-J4 
Drunk and disorderly under circumstances to bring discredit upon 
military 
134-J5 Drunk and disorderly-other 
134-J6 Drinking liquor with prisoner 
134-J7 Drunk prisoner 
134-J8 Disorderly conduct to bring discredit upon military 
134-J9 Disorderly on station 
134-M1 False swearing 
134-N1 Firearm, discharge-through negligence 
134-N2 Firearm, discharge-willfully endangering human life 
134-N3 Weapon:  concealed, carrying 
134-O1 Fleeing the scene of accident 
134-R4 Indecent language-communicating indecent language all other 
134-T2 Mail:  depositing or causing obscene matters to be deposited 
134-U1 Misprison of serious offense 
134-U2 Obstructing justice 
134-U3 Perjury:  subornation of 
134-U8 Wrongfully refusing to testify 
  MILITARY OFFENSES 
082-B1 Solicitation to desert 
082-B2 Solicitation to mutiny 
082-B3 Solicitation to commit an act of misbehavior before the enemy 
082-B4 Solicitation to commit an act of sedition 
083-A- Fraudulent enlistment or appointment 
083-B- Fraudulent separation 
084-A- Effecting an unlawful enlistment or appointment 
084-B- Effecting an unlawful separation 
085-A- Desertion with intent to avoid hazardous duty, etc. 
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085-B1 Desertion terminated by apprehension 
085-B2 Desertion terminated otherwise 
085-C1 
Desertion prior to acceptance of resignation terminated by 
apprehension 
085-C2 Desertion prior to acceptance of resignation terminated otherwise 
085-D- Desertion in time of war 
086-A1 Going from appointed place of duty without authority 
086-A2 Failure to go to appointed place of duty at the time prescribed 
086-B1 Unauthorized absence, three days or less 
086-B2 Unauthorized absence, more than three but less than 30 days 
086-B3 Unauthorized absence, over 30 days 
086-B4 Unauthorized absence over 30 days terminated by apprehension 
086-C1 Unauthorized absence from a guard or watch 
086-C2 Unauthorized absences from a guard or watch with intent to abandon  
086-D- 
Unauthorized absence with intent to avoid maneuvers or field 
exercises 
087-A- Missing movement through design 
087-B- Missing movement through neglect 
088--- Contempt toward officials by a commissioned officer 
089--- Disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer 
090-B1 
Willful disobedience of a lawful command of a superior commissioned 
officer 
090-B2 
Willful disobedience of a lawful command of a superior commissioned 
officer in time of war 
091-B1 Willful disobedience of warrant officer by a W.O. or enlisted person 
091-B2 Willful disobedience of an NCO by a W.O. or NCO 
091-C1 Contempt or disrespect toward warrant officer in execution of office 
091-C2 Contempt or disrespect toward NCO in execution of office 
091-C3 Contempt or disrespect toward other NCO in execution of office 
092-A0 Fail to obey general order: Other 
092-A1 Fail to obey general order:  Appearance 
092A10 Fail to obey general order:  Misuse of Government Travel Card 
092-A3 Fail to obey general order:  Unprofessional relationship 
092-A5 Fail to obey general order:  Violation of security regulations 
092-A6 Fail to obey general order:  Sexual harassment 
092-A7 Fail to obey general order:  Conflict of interest violations 
092-A8 Fail to obey general order:  Traffic violations 
092-B- Failure to obey other lawful written order or regulation 
092-B1 Government computer violation--Pornography 
092-B2 Government computer violation--Other 
092-C1 Dereliction in the performance of duties:  Neglect 
092-C2 Dereliction in the performance of duties:  Willful 





Dereliction in the performance of duties:  Misuse of Government 
Purchase Card 
093--- Cruelty or maltreatment of a person subject to one's orders 
094-A1 Mutiny:  By violence or disturbance 
094-A2 Mutiny:  Refusing to obey orders or perform duty 
094-A3 Mutiny:  Failure to suppress or report a mutiny 
094-A4 Mutiny:  Failure to report 
094-B1 Sedition 
094-B2 Failure to suppress or report an act of sedition 
094-B3 Sedition:  Failure to report 
098-A- Unnecessary delay in disposing of case 
098-B- Failure to comply with or enforce procedural rules 
099-A- Running away in the presence of the enemy 
099-B- Shamefully abandoning, surrendering, or delivering up command 
099-C- Endangering safety of a command, unit, place, etc 
099-D- Casting away arms or ammunition 
099-E- Cowardly conduct before the enemy 
099-F- Quitting place of duty to plunder or pillage 
099-G- Causing false alarms 
099-H- Willfully failing to do utmost to encounter enemy 
099-I- Failing to afford relief and assistance 
100-A- Compelling surrender or attempting to compel surrender 
100-B- Striking the colors or flag before the enemy 
101-A- Unauthorized disclosure or improper use of a countersign 
102--- Forcing a safeguard 
103-A1 Failure to secure captured or abandoned property-$100 or less 
103-A2 Failure to secure captured or abandoned property-more than $100 
104-A- Aiding the enemy 
104-B- Harboring or protecting the enemy 
104-C- Giving intelligence to the enemy 
104-D- Communicating with the enemy 
105-A- Misconduct as a prisoner in the hands of the enemy 
105-B- Maltreatment of another prisoner 
107-A- Signing a false official statement 
107-B- Making a false official statement 
113-A1 Misbehavior of a sentinel or lookout in time of war 
113-A2 Misbehavior of sentinel or lookout in areas designated for special pay 
113-A3 Misbehavior of sentinel or lookout - other 
115-A1 Malingering-time of war 
115-A2 Malingering-feigning illness or disability 
115-B1 Malingering-intentionally inflicting self-injury in time of war 
115-B2 Malingering-intentionally inflicting self injury 
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131-B- Subscribing false statement 
133-A- 
Conduct unbecoming an officer-copying or using examination paper of 
another 
133-C- Conduct unbecoming an officer-unprofessional relationship 
133-D- Conduct unbecoming an officer-other 
134-A1 Abusing a public animal 
134-B3 Cohabitation, wrongful 
134-B4 Fraternization 
134-G1 Correctional custody--Escape  
134-G2 Correctional custody--Breach 
134-G3 Quarantine: medical, breaking 
134-G4 Restriction, breaking 
134-H2 Debt, dishonorably failing to pay gov’t travel card 
134-H2 Fail to pay debt:  Government Travel Card 
134-I1 Uttering disloyal statements undermining discipline and loyalty 
134-P1 Gambling by an NCO with subordinate 
134-P3 Straggling 
134-P4 Wearing unauthorized insignia, decoration, badge, ribbon 
134-U4 Obstructing proceedings before departments, agencies or committees 
134-W1 
Sentinel or lookout:  Disrespect to a sentinel or lookout in execution of 
duty 
134-W2 
Sentinel or lookout:  Loitering or wrongfully sitting down on post in 
time of war 
134-W3 Sentinel or lookout:  Loitering or wrongfully sitting down on post  
134-Y1 Crimes and offenses not capital 
134-Y2 Offenses under the Assimilated Crimes Act 
134-Y3 Other crimes in violation of State Laws 




Appendix C: Maximum Punishment Scale 
 
Code Maximum Punishment 
1 1 month 
2 3 months 
3 4 months 
4 6 months 
5 Bad Conduct Discharge, 6 months 
6 Bad Conduct Discharge, 9 months 
7 Bad Conduct Discharge, 1 year 
8 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 1 year 
9 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 1.5 years 
10 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 2 years 
11 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 3 years 
12 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 5 years 
13 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 6 years 
14 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 7 years 
15 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 8 years 
16 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 10 years 
17 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 15 years 
18 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, 20 years or greater, but less than Life* 
19 Dismissal or Dishonorable Discharge, Life with or without parole 
20 Death or Life with or without parole 
21 Death, Mandatory Minimum Life with parole  
*For UCMJ specific offenses, no maximum punishment exists  that is greater than 20 years but less than 
life; however, federal and state crimes may be assimilated under the UCMJ that carry maximum 
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